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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is investigate if the Norwegian Supreme Court exhibits a state 
friendly nature when they vote in dissenting civilian cases where one of the litigants is 
the state in the time period 1991-2012. The state friendly hypothesis holds that the 
state tends to win more cases than private litigants, and that this tendency can’t be 
explained by only the legal aspects of a case. Therefore this thesis will explore the 
non-legal factors that are apt to influence how a justice votes. Some of these factors 
are the ideology of the justice, measured by appointing government, the personal 
traits of the justice, factors connected to the case and the influence of the collegial 
nature of the court. This can be summed up in the research question: What factors 
influences the Supreme Court Justices in dissenting cases where the state is one of the 
litigants.  
 
There are several theoretical models for analysing the voting behaviour of the 
Supreme Court. The most central of these models in this thesis is the Attitudinal 
Model. The thesis features an in-depth discussion on why the Attitudinal Model is 
applicable for research on the Norwegian Supreme Court 
 
To test the hypothesis, the thesis utilises a logistical regression model consisting of 
509 justice-observations. The optimal model for analysing hierarchical data, a 
multilevel model could not be used in this analysis because this model is not 
applicable when only analysing dissenting cases. The lack of multilevel analysis made 
panel effects mostly impossible to determine.  
 
The results of the analysis show that justices appointed by social-democratic 
governments are statistically more likely to vote in favour of the state than justices 
appointed by non-social democratic governments. The results also showed that former 
occupation in the Legislation Department was had an especially strong positive effect 
for voting for the state, while being a former law professor had a negative effect. In 
addition the results showed that the degree of state friendliness varied between 
different areas of the law.  
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“The question is not so much whether law plays a role, as what role it plays” 
Friedman (2006:264) 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The debate on whether the Norwegian Supreme Court
1
 is state friendly is not new. 
The historian Jens Arup Seip wrote in 1965 that the Supreme Court was not only a 
political, but that the institution’s political involvement had been unusually strong. 
This claim was disputed by jurist and Law Professor Johs. Andenæs who claimed 
Seip’s statement was “historically misleading”  (1965:92). In recent the debate on the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and politics has remerged with the statistical 
studies of the justices voting preferences conducted by Gunnar Grendstad, William R. 
Shaffer and Eric N. Waltenburg (2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012c). The studies showed a 
controversial connection between the justices’ ideology operationalized as the 
appointing government of the justice and the votes in cases where the case is between 
the central state and private actors (Grendstad et al. 2011b) and in economic cases 
where public interests stand against private interests (Grendstad et al. 2010, Grendstad 
et al. 2011a, Grendstad et al. 2012c).  
As in 1965 the law community is sceptical of the existence and meaning of such a 
link between votes and politics, Chief Justice Tore Schei characterized the link as 
“meaningless” (2011: 335) and Associate Justice Jens Edvin Andreassen Skoghøy 
described the connection as “obviously untenable”((2010: 723-724). More 
constructive comments and arguments have come from Professor of Law at the 
University of Bergen Jørn Sunde who stated that the results challenge “the 
constitutional divide between the first and third branch of government”. A connection 
between how a justice vote and politics will challenge the traditional view where the 
Supreme Court is independent from the rest of the state apparatus. This is especially 
important since according to Andenæs (1998:164) a central part of what the Supreme 
Court does is to determine if individuals have been abused or incorrectly treated by 
the state. 
 
                                                        
1
 Herby referred to as the Supreme Court 
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1.1 Research Question 
 
The Norwegian Supreme Court is state friendly in as far as they win more cases than 
private actors in the Supreme Court. This is one of the foundational claims of the state 
friendly hypothesis. The second claim is that this state friendly effect occurs as a 
result of the individual justices ideology and personal traits. A third claim is that the 
effect of ideology and personal traits is stronger in important cases. The fourth claim 
is that the collegial nature and structure and nature of the court have an impact on the 
justices’ decision-making.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to show to what extent ideology, personal traits, traits 
connected to the case and the composure of a judicial panel in the court influence 
state friendly voting. This leads to following research question: 
 
What factors influences the Supreme Court Justices in dissenting cases where the 
state is one of the litigants.  
 
To answer this question this thesis will analyse dissenting cases in five-justice panels 
from 1991 to 2012. The thesis will also focus on how the effects of ideology and 
personal traits play out over different areas of the law.  
 
There are several different theoretical models for analysing supreme court voting 
behaviour. This thesis will mostly focus on the applicability and premise of the 
Attitudinal Model, though the other theoretical models will also be discussed and to 
some extent utilized. 
 
The method for analysis will be logistical analysis. The hierarchical structure of the 
court suggests that a multilevel model would be optimal, but as results later will 
show, a multilevel level is not appropriate to use when all the selected cases include at 
least one dissenting opinion.  
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1.2 Overview of the Thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will present the 
theoretical framework. The Supreme Court as an institution will described in detail, 
including the organization and role of the court and the appointment process. Chapter 
2 will also conclude with an in-depth discussion of the applicability of the Attitudinal 
Model, since the use of this approach has been criticised by the legal community. 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the different theoretical approaches for analysing supreme 
court behaviour. These different models include the Attitudinal Model, the Legal 
Model and strategic-interaction models.  
 
Chapter 4 will deal with the state friendly hypothesis in more detail and hypotheses 
that will be tested in this thesis will be stated in this chapter. Chapter 5 will outline the 
statistical method that will be used in this thesis. Chapter 6 will provide information 
on the data that will be analysed and how the variables are operationalized.  Chapter 7 
will be the analysis chapter where the statistical models and results will be provided. 
The chapter will conclude with hypothesis testing.  The conclusions and implications 
of this thesis will be discussed in chapter 8. 
 
Most Norwegian terms will be translated into English, but the Norwegian term will be 
put in parenthesis the first time a word or term is used.  
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Chapter 2 - The Framework of the Norwegian Supreme Court 
2.1 General  
 
The Norwegian Supreme Court was established in 1815. Its mandate is founded on 
article 88 of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814. The article states that “the Supreme 
Court pronounces judgment in the final instance”, thereby making it the highest court 
in Norway and with full jurisdiction over the entire country. The main function of the 
Supreme Court is according to itself to “ensure uniformity of legal process and to 
contribute to the resolution of matters on which the law is unclear”. The Supreme 
Court also has a responsibility “for the evolution of the law - within the framework of 
existing legislation - as and when required by new societal problems” (The Supreme 
Court of Norway)
2
. As the highest court in the country, and the last court of appeals in 
nearly all cases
3
, the justices only select cases where the result will have legal, 
practical or political consequences beyond the specific case in question or if the case 
is complex or controversial. 
 
The following paragraphs will deal with the formal characteristics of the Supreme 
Court, such as its organization, appointment process, voting process and which 
sources of law the justices take into consideration when the Court rule on a case. This 
chapter will conclude with an in-depth discussion on why the Attitudinal Model is 
applicable for research on the Norwegian Supreme Court based on the institutional 
structure of the Supreme Court. 
 
2.2 Organization of the Norwegian Supreme Court 
 
The current Supreme Court is led by Chief Justice Tore Schei
4
 and in addition the 
court consists of 19 associate justices.  The number of justices has been gradually 
increased since its foundation in 1815. When selected, the nominee must be at least 
30 years of age according the article 91 of the Constitution and the forced retirement 
                                                        
2
 http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/The-Supreme-Court-of-Norway-/ 
3
 A rare exception is the possibility to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
4
 Due to retire in 2015 
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age is set at 70 (Sunde 2011a:5). Until that time the justices are employed on good 
behaviour, and can only be forced to resign by being convicted of impeachment or 
other serious crime.
5
 
The court itself has unilateral power to select or dismiss potential cases. A revolving 
panel of three Supreme Court justices called the Appeals Selection Committee 
(Ankeutvalget)
6
 determine if eligible appeals is to be heard by the Court 
(Domstoloven of 1915 § 5). Although the Dispute Act (Lov om mekling og rettergang 
i sivile tvister) allows for oral proceedings when necessary in the Appeals Selection 
Committee, the vast majority of appeals are only handled in writing. In the original 
form of the Dispute Act, the Appeals Selection Committee needed a valid reason for 
dismissing an appeal. In the current form of the act is required that the Committee 
have a valid reason for granting the appeal. (Schei 2008,Skoghøy 2008:488). This has 
a filtering effect ensuring that important cases are granted appeal and other cases are 
dismissed. 
 
The vast majority of the cases
7
 selected to be heard by the court are decided by one of 
the two parallel and equal divisions (Avdelinger) each consisting of 5 justices. These 
panels are also revolving, unlike for instance the panels in the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which has fixed divisions. This leads 
to a system of randomization, where no attorney or their client can know which 
justices who will precede in their case at the time they submit their appeal.  
 
In cases of great importance i.e. cases relating to the Constitution, international 
cooperation, conflict between laws, judicial review or if the court might change prior 
precedent, it has been the case since 1926 that the case can be decided in a plenary 
session (Plenum) consisting of all eligible justices. (Sunde 2011a:8). If the number of 
justices is not an odd number the justice with the shortest tenure shall withdraw from 
the case (Domstoloven of 1915 § 5).  Cases of somewhat less importance dealing with 
the same issues can since 2008 be decided in Grand Chamber (Storkammer) 
consisting eleven justices (Sunde 2011a:8). 
                                                        
5
 Neither of these scenarios has yet occurred Sunde 2011a:5) 
6
 Prior to 2008 this part of the court was named Høyesterett Kjæremålsutvalg, and in principle it was 
classed as a separate court, though consisting of justices of the Supreme Court 
7
 If one doesn’t count cases dismissed in the Appeals Selection Committee 
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The cases chosen too be heard by the court are presented orally by the attorneys of the 
parties involved. Unlike the procedure in the lower courts there is no presentation of 
evidence or testimony
8
. All cases are in the end decided by a simple majority vote. 
The cases are open to the public if nothing else is requested by one of the parties
9
 and 
the request is granted by the court. Both the prevailing opinion(s) and dissenting 
opinion(s) are made available on the Court’s website, published in Norsk Rettstiende 
and published on the website Lovdata. 
2.3 The Appointment Process  
 
All Norwegian Supreme Court justices
10
 are formally appointed by the King in 
Council (Kongen i Statsråd). This prerogative is founded upon § 21 of the 
Constitution. The King (in practise the Government Cabinet) makes the appointment 
based on a recommendation from the politically independent Judicial Appointments 
Board (Innstillingsrådet for Dommere), which is a subgroup of the Norwegian Courts 
Administration (Domstoladministrasjonen, Skoghøy 2011b:1). This system is 
relatively new modification. Prior to 2002 the selection process was under the 
jurisdiction of the Court Division of the Ministry of Justice, (Skoghøy 2011b, 19). 
The only advice on prospective justices given outside the Court Division was by the 
Chief Justice after consultation with the associate justices.  
 
This system was however changed after an official evaluation titled NOU 1999: 19 
“The Courts in Society” (Domstolene i samfunnet) published in 1999. Based on 
report’s recommendations, a proposition for reform of the court administration in 
Norway was proposed in Ot. prp. nr. 44 (2000–2001). This led to major changes in 
the Court of Justice Act (Domstolloven) of 1915, where court appointments are 
covered in articles 54, 55 and 55a-i. 
 
                                                        
8
 Only expert testimony is rarely accepted at the request of the justices preceding over the case  
9
 Which is very rare since the case documents of the proceedings in lower courts normally are publicly 
available and the parties in the case very seldom are present in the Supreme Court. 
10
 With the exception of the Chief Justice, who is recruited from within the Supreme Court but also 
confirmed by the King in Council. 
 12 
The Judicial Appointments Board consists of seven members; three are judges from 
the lower courts, one member is an attorney not working for state, one member is a 
jurist working for the state and the last two members do not have a law degree. The 
reason for this process and the composition of the board is based on “democratic, 
constitutional, professional and public concerns” according to the Judicial 
Appointments Board. The Appointments Board does not however select candidates, 
and theoretically everyone with a law education (within the age boundaries) can apply 
for the position, though for obvious reasons only the top candidates are given serious 
consideration. 
 
The Judicial Appointments Board ranks the most qualified and eligible justices from 
one to three, and the King has so far always chosen the number one recommendation. 
In addition to legal qualification the Board considers age, sex, prior work experience 
and place of birth to create a diverse court (Sunde 2011:5).  
 
One part of the process is fairly similar to how it was before the reform. The Chief 
Justice still gives his advice and recommendation after consultation with the associate 
justices. This process has however been more formalized, and the written advice is 
given directly to the Ministry of Justice after the Judicial Appointments Board have 
made its recommendation (Courts of Justice law of 1915 article 55b, section 4.) This 
written advice is also made available to the public. The process of the each 
recommendation from the Judicial Appointments Board is also subject to a very 
limited review from the Justice Department.
11
  
 
2.4 The Voting Process 
 
The first step after a case is heard by the court is called “Rådslaging”, which is a 
formal discussion among the justices regarding the case. The justice with the most 
seniority is selected to be the court foreman
12
, and he or she presents the case, the 
arguments presented by each side’s attorneys, the legal and factual questions in the 
case and his or her view on these matters. After that, each of the other justices 
                                                        
11
 Mostly deals with formal aspects such as background check 
12
 The Chief Justice always serves as court foreman when involved in a case 
 13 
presents their views according to seniority. (Schei 2010:15). They then decide which 
of the justices that are going to write the opinion (and dissenting opinion if the 
justices do not agree on the result or major parts of the arguments). The justices take 
turns writing, according to when they last wrote an opinion. The Rådslaging is ended 
with the justices setting a date for the final vote, and in between these dates the 
preliminary opinion(s) is written (Schei 2010:15). The other justices in the case then 
comment on the preliminary opinion. The opinion-writer then chooses to edit the 
opinion according to the comments (edits based on the comments are normally 
included) in the revised opinion (Schei 2010:15). The revised opinion(s) are then 
reviewed on the Domskonferanse, the meeting where the justices give their final vote.  
2.5 Sources of Law  
 
All Norwegian judges and justices in the lower and higher courts are constrained by 
the sources of law that are applicable in the specific case.  There is not a full 
agreement among legal scholars on which sources these are, or how they are 
hierarchy structured compared to each other, and the validity and relevance of the 
sources of law differ from case to case. Nevertheless a system first theorized by 
Torstein Eckhoff in 1971
13
 in the hallmark book “Rettskildelære” is both taught at all 
of the Norwegian law schools and is clearly the most widely accepted approach 
among legal scholars. In this book Eckhoff mentions seven different acceptable 
sources of law: the law itself, preoperational notes to the law
14
, court precedent
15
 
(sometimes refereed to as the formal sources of law), public practise, private practice, 
legal theory and equity considerations (reele hensyn). In addition to these there is 
agreement that also international law, which both consists of practise in foreign 
countries and precedent set by international courts
16
 can be taken into consideration. 
 
                                                        
13
 Later revisons after Eckhoffs death in 1993 are written by Jan E. Helgesen.  
14
 The most significant of these are Norske Offentlige Utredninger (NOUs) and Stortingspreposisjoner, 
formely known as Odelstingspreposisjoner (St. props and Ot. props). 
15
 If relevant to the case, these first three sources have the most legal influence 
16
 Most important are precedent set by the European Court of Human Right, the EFTA-court and the 
EU-court in policy-areas where Norway is bound these courts.  
 14 
When it comes to contradictive law (two laws or more pointing to different outcomes) 
there are three main guiding principles for resolution: Lex superior; international 
human rights and the Norwegian Constitution precedes “normal” law, which again 
precedes written regulations. Lex specialis; special law precedes general law and 
lastly Lex posterior; newer laws precedes older laws. 
There is disagreement among legal scholars to what degree the sources of law 
constrain the justices sphere to operate freely in (see Bergo 2002, Bergo 2003, 
Grendstad et al. 2011a, Kinander 2002, Sunde 2012). The source of law that gives the 
justices the most freedom in their argumentation is clearly equity considerations. 
 
Equitable considerations can be loosely defined as non-legal considerations that might 
influence how the justices vote. Eckhoff viewed public policy considerations as 
taking into account concerns about what is just, balanced and serves the overall 
purpose of the legal principle or the law in question (2001:24). The aspect that most 
clearly separates equitable considerations from the other sources of law is that equity 
is a product of the justices own considerations” (Eckhoff 2001:24 own translation). 
This leads to that justices is given a legally accepted way to consider interests and 
views that are political in nature (Eckhoff 2001:375).  For these reasons a number of 
legal scholars are critical to the use of public policy considerations. Kinander (2002) 
and Bergo (2002, 2003) argue that justices should return to a more formal use of the 
sources of law, which could lead to more predictable verdicts (in a legal context).  
 
On the other hand Eckhoff argues that formal use of equitable considerations is 
beneficial because it correctly and publicly displays the considerations that justices 
make, regardless of the sources of law. There is little doubt that justices to some 
extent can take their personal considerations into account when they interpret for 
instance the letter of the law and legal precedent.  
 
Equitable considerations can then serve a purpose since justices does not need to 
“bury” their own views in the other sources of view. (Eckhoff 1997:360). The reality 
according to former associate justice Ketil Lund
17
 is that the court can provide a 
convincing judicial arguments that points to different outcomes based on legal 
                                                        
 
17
 His tenure on the Suprme Court started in 1990 and ended in 2009 
 15 
reasoning,, without the need to include equitable considerations (Lund 1987, 216-217) 
Current Associate Justice Skoghøy also points out that the use of public policy 
considerations is in line with how the Norwegian society perceives the legal system. 
(2011b:13) 
 
The central argument in a verdict is called ratio decidendi, which can be understood 
as the rational for a decision.  The courts has in later years been more open to 
comment on the legality of aspects of the case that are not directly relevant to their 
opinion of the outcome of the case. Such statements are known as obiter dicta, which 
have some, though considerably less legal weight (as precedent) compared to the 
main arguments in the opinion. Other newer developments regarding the sources of 
law is that the court is less adherent to prior precedent and the justices are more open 
to citing legal theory (Skoghøy 1996). Schei predicts that more questions will deal 
with the constitution and judicial review because of the increase of cases regarding 
the relationship between international treaties and international law Norwegian law 
(Schei 2004_133). 
 
2.6 Is the Attitudinal Model applicable to the Norwegian Supreme Court?  
 
The Attitudinal Model as a theory is clearly based on the institutional framework of 
the United States Supreme Court. An important question therefore rises since the 
institutional framework of the U.S. and Norwegian Supreme Court undeniably differ 
to a large extent: Is the Attitudinal Model applicable to analyse the behaviour of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court and its justices? 
 
One who thinks that the Attitudinal Model is not applicable to study Norway is law 
professor Jørn Sunde, Sunde has criticised the research by Grendstad et. al. based on 
the use of the Attitudinal Model for their premise. Grendstad et al. answered Sunde’s 
concerns in the article “Mellom nøytralitet og aktivisme: Lovene tolker ikke seg selv” 
(2012b).  
 
One critique by Sunde is that the premise is faulty since the U.S. Supreme Court deals 
with more (relative to caseload) constitutional cases, which he writes “has a clearer 
 16 
political dimension than other areas of law” (2012:176). This is of course true if one 
defines constitutional questions as inherently more political than other areas of law. 
With regards to descriptive statistics, Sunde is right. Roughly 34 percent of the cases 
the U.S. Supreme dealt with in 2004 to 2010 was of a constitutional nature, which is 
considerably higher than the number of constitutional cases handled by the 
Norwegian Supreme Court in the same timeframe. But as Grendstad et al replies, 
there is no reason to believe the relevance of the traits and attitudes of the justices are 
limited to constitutional cases (2012b:529).   
 
Sunde also states that the room justices have for political activism is far smaller for 
than political scientists claim in the sense that justices have their “judicial zone” that 
they keep to, which can not be described as politics.. Grendstad et. al. states that one 
does not equate supreme court politics and legislative politics and that conflict 
between different parties is central. Grendstad et. al. also quote Chief Justice Smith 
who stated “any collegial court is […] a form of legislature in miniature” and that it 
does not make sense to claim that the creation of laws in the Storting is political, but 
that the creation of law in the Supreme Court is apolitical (1975:298).  
 
Sunde also stated that the institutional difference between America and Norway is too 
large transfer the Attitudinal model to the Norwegian context. Grendstad et. al. 
answer this by pointing to similarities between the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Norwegian Supreme Court. Central similarities are: the Supreme Courts are on top of 
their country’s hierarchy and have full jurisdiction of cases, the cases that are heard 
by the court are uncertain in outcome and that the justices are not accountable for 
their decisions. Though these similarities are crucial, there are more elements that 
must be compared to determine the applicability of the Attitudinal Model based on the 
institutional character of the Supreme Court.  
 
What follows is therefore an in-depth discussion on the applicability of the Attitudinal 
Model on the Norwegian legal system and more specifically the Supreme Court. This 
analysis will be based on a comparative analysis of several major components that 
together make up a national legal system. The countries that will be compared are 
obviously Norway, the United States since the Attitudinal Model was developed with 
this legal system in mind and France. The main reasoning for including France is that 
 17 
France in many regards the most typical civil law country in the world, which marks a 
stark contrast to the United States as a common law country
18
. Therefore France 
represents a legal system where the Attitudinal Model is impossible to apply for 
several reasons, which will be mentioned below. 
2.7 A Comparison of Norwegian, American and French Legal Tradition
19
 
 
This discussion will be based on the Legal Culture Model as stated by Jørn Sunde in 
Champagne at the Funeral - An Introduction to Legal Culture. Legal Culture is 
defined broadly as “is ideas and expectations of law made operational by institutional 
(-like) practices” (2010:1).  
 
Table 1: Legal Culture Model by Jørn Sunde 
 
 
The legal culture model outlines the different elements of legal culture. Simply put, 
civil law countries can be said to belong in the Legal System category, whereas 
common law countries are in the Legal Order category 
                                                        
18
 A notable exception in the U.S. is the state of Louisiana that followed the civil law tradition from 
French colonial rule even after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and is therefore to this today unique.  
19
 As someone who has attended and taken an exam in the relevant subject “Legal History and 
Comparative Law” taught by Sunde, I am in decent position perform this comparative analysis.  
Legal 
 
historical 
period 
 
 
Legal culturally structures and structural elements 
 Institutional structure Intellectual structure 
 Conflict 
 
resolution 
Norm 
 
production 
Idea of justice Legal 
 
method 
Degree of 
 
professional- 
ization 
Character of 
 
international- 
ization 
Legal 
 
System 
Court 
 
hierarchy 
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The Legal Culture Model is firstly divided into an Institutional structure and an 
Intellectual structure. The Institutional structure consists of two components; Conflict 
resolution is basically how and who have been given the competence to solve legal 
question and norm production which mainly deals with who has jurisdiction to make 
new law or change existing law.  
 
The Intellectual structure consists of four components. One component is idea of 
justice, which in this context means what is the guiding principle for deciding what is 
just and lawful. Another component is legal method, which is closely linked to the 
idea of justice and how such ideals are achieved in practise. Thirdly is degree of 
professionalization for those who practise law either as a jurist, lawyer or judge. 
Lastly is the character of internationalization which points to how independent the 
legal culture is with regards to implementation of foreign law and the effect of 
supranational courts and institutions. Relevant examples of such institution in the 
Norwegian context are for instance the European Union and European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 
With regards to conflict resolution it is especially the court hierarchy that makes the 
Attitudinal Model impractical in a French setting. France relies upon a number of 
specialized courts and on top of the hierarchical pyramid there are four courts of 
which the most important is the Court of Cassation, which is the highest appeals court 
for civil and criminal matters. The Court of Cassation consists of over 120 judges in 
six divisions handling different areas of law. This is very different from the U.S. State 
Supreme Courts, the Federal District Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court, which are 
not divided into divisions. The lack of fixed divisions can also be seen the Norwegian 
Tingerettene, Lagmannsrettene and the Norwegian Supreme Court. France also have a 
Constitutional Council consisting of among others former Presidents. This council 
reviews proposed laws before they go into effect, which is different from Norway and 
the U.S. where the highest courts only can review claims about unlawfulness after the 
specific law has come into effect. In this respect Norway is quite similar to the United 
States. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has a major role in norm production since what it decides 
immediately becomes the law of the land. This very active role that in practice 
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produces new law or changes existing law is a consequence of that the main idea of 
justice within common law is equity, wherein the justices have discretion to find a fair 
result in the specific case. Predictability is then achieved through the existence and 
the binding effect of prior court arguments known as precedent. The legal method 
used by justices is differentiating
20
 the new case with prior court precedent. The 
reason for the focus on precedent is that common law countries historically and still to 
a large extent rely upon law formed through court decisions or single acts or statutes 
that are limited in scope and its content are shaped by the courts through their 
decisions.  
 
Judicial predictability in the U.S. is also ensured in a more indirect way. Since it is the 
President who nominates justices to the Supreme Court and the Senate who confirms 
them, one can expect that the nominated justice has the same view as the President on 
most major legal questions. And if the President doesn’t have the needed support in 
the Senate one can usually expect a compromise justice who though mostly supports 
the Presidents views can be considered a judicial moderate not leaning too far the 
either the right or the left.    
 
The French approach to the influence of prior decisions can be regarded as nearly the 
opposite of that in common law countries. French law is exclusively produced by the 
legislature, mainly expanding or rewriting the existing law books. The civil code of 
France for instance was first produced in 1804 and it and the other French law books 
are designed to leave little room for interpretation up to the judge. The central idea of 
justice in civil law countries as demonstrated by French law is predictability through 
the letter of the law, and the legal method for achieving this is deduction. But France, 
as compared to for instance Germany (also a civil law country) takes one step further 
when it in practise prohibits any judicial activism. 
 
The published court rulings in France consist only of the formal facts of the case and 
the final outcome. The part of the verdict that is public is written in one sentence, 
usually stretched to about one page of writing. The arguments and judicial reasoning 
of the judge are not published, neither is information if there were a dissenting 
                                                        
20
 Finding common or different aspects with existing precedent to see if the same principles apply or 
not 
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opinion. These restrictions are put in place to ensure that nothing but predictability 
through the law can be found, and obviously these measures would make the 
Attitudinal Model very difficult to use for analysing judicial preferences within the 
French court system.  
 
Compared to these two “extremes”, Norway finds itself in a strange position since it 
encompasses traits from both the civil law and the common law tradition. The large 
majority of Norwegian law is produced in the legislature, but the courts can through 
their interpretation of laws in reality modify the written laws. Compared to common 
law countries these modifications are smaller in scope both in terms of how often it 
occurs and the extent of the changes, which most often limits itself to how a specific 
word should be understood in the context of the legal paragraph or the specific law.  
 
The vast majority of Norwegian laws are larger (in terms number of paragraphs and 
scope) than laws produced in common law countries, but on the other hand Norway 
has no tradition of legislating through law books as in France or Germany. This was 
however not the intent when the constitution was written. Article 94 of the Norwegian 
Constitution states that “The first, or if this is not possible, the second ordinary 
Storting, shall make provision for the publication of a new general civil and criminal 
code” which demonstrates that if this had happened within the stated timeframe (the 
first criminal code was enacted in 1842 and after several attempts the idea a 
comprehensive civil code was finally abandoned around the year 1900) Norway 
would have looked more like a typical civil law country and the Attitudinal Model 
would be a lot less applicable.  
 
The fact that Norway didn’t enact a comprehensive civil code leads to a 
comparatively less focus on strict system oriented solutions than in civil law 
countries, though this aspect is also a relevant factor when interpreting Norwegian 
law. The majority of the written Norwegian laws are not designed to leave much room 
for interpretation up to the judge (as in for instance France), but several relatively 
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important
21
 articles incorporates legal standards where the article specifically 
mentions words as “(un)fair” or “standing business ethics” which leads much 
interpretation up to the judge and a focus on prior decisions that can be construed to 
be relevant to the case.  
 
Unlike Norway and the United States, France also a specialized system for educating 
justices. After the standard 3-year Bachelor in Law education and a 2-year Master in 
Law all prospective judges must complete 3-years of post-graduate studies at the 
 cole nationale de la magistrature ( rench National School for the Judiciary). 
Because of this special schooling all French justices are homogeneous when it comes 
to education.  This is different from prospective justices in Norway and the U.S. 
where there’s no requirement for specialized education for justices, and the only 
formal requirement is a law degree.  
 
A uniform education is likely to influence the applicability of the Attitudinal Model. 
When all the justices have gone through identical studies at the same school there’s 
reason to believe that the justices are indoctrinated (for lack of a better word) to one 
specific judicial approach in terms of both behaviour and values. Such a view 
strengthened by the fact that most justices in  rance doesn’t have any experience 
outside their work as a justice since most prospective justices start at the French 
National School for the Judiciary after completing their standard law education and 
few abandon their career path as a judge after completing the education.  
 
Compared to justices in Norway and the United States where the vast majority 
justices have spent part of their legal career not working as a justice it’s reasonable to 
believe that they take with them values, a more independent approach to the law etc. 
into their career as justices. And since the justices prior work experience varies to a 
large extent such values will not be homogenous as in France 
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 i.e. Avtaleloven (Law of Contracts) § 36 which is an article that often results in legal disagreements 
and is a clause which leaves much room to the judge to find a fair result based on nearly every factor 
that it relevant to the case.  
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The degree of internationalization is not the most relevant factor with regards to the 
applicability of the Attitudinal Model, but it is logical that justices in the American 
Supreme Court are “freer” because they very seldom have to take into consideration 
any international treaties or how such treaties should be understood. The justices on 
the Norwegian Supreme Court are normally somewhat “freer” than  rench justices 
because of Norway’s more indirect relationship with the E.U and its laws.  
 
How applicable is the Attitudinal Model on the Norwegian legal system and more 
specifically the Supreme Court? Based on the components of the legal culture model 
developed by Jørn Sunde it’s clear that the Attitudinal Model isn’t perfectly 
applicable to use on the Norwegian legal system, at least compared to the United 
States legal system The main factor that challenges the applicability of the Attitudinal 
Model on the Norwegian legal system is the amount and the extent of norm 
production that is shaped Norwegian Supreme Court, which is considerably less than 
in the U.S., because of Norway’s greater reliance and focus on the written laws. 
Another factor that challenges applicability of the Attitudinal Model is the fact that 
judicial appointees in the U.S. are clearly in part political appointees by design.  
 
On the other hand it’s clear that Norway is not a typical civil law country, and it’s 
doubtful that Norway one the whole even can be said to be a civil law country in my 
opinion. Norway shares none to the numerous characteristics in the French legal 
culture that makes the Attitudinal Model inapplicable. Norwegian justices can be said 
to be constrained by the law, but not bound by the law as the justices in France are. 
Justices are also recruited from all walks of judicial life, and not from one specific 
post-graduate study. The design of Norwegian law and the guidelines for 
interpretation also open for much interpretation compared to French law, and a 
significant part of Norwegian law is unwritten and based on basic legal principles that 
has evolved through numerous court decisions, which is quite similar to the United 
States.  Norway is also very liberal when it comes to the publishing of verdicts, where 
all the arguments of the justice(s) including dissenting opinions are published, which 
is a basic requirement for the applicability of the Attitudinal Model.  
 
All in all, Norway finds itself in a mixed position between civil law and common law. 
The Norwegian judicial method for instance encompasses traits from both civil law 
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(deduction) and common law (differentiation), the idea of justice in Norway consists 
of equity (common law) both through what is known as reelle hensyn and fairness 
criteria which is not unusual in Norwegian legal articles and predictability through the 
letter of the law itself and how the terms are understood in prior decisions. 
 
In conclusion; though the Attitudinal Model was designed for the U.S. legal system, 
and is clearly most applicable in common law countries, there are not any single traits 
in the Norwegian legal tradition that makes the Attitudinal Model inapplicable, nor 
does it seem as the Norwegian legal system as whole is incompatible with the 
Attitudinal Model. Therefore the attitudinal model is applicable for research on the 
Norwegian Supreme Court. 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical Models of Supreme Court decision-making 
 
Though supreme court decisions and to some degree judicial behaviour always have 
been analysed by jurists and politicians, it’s a much newer field of study for political 
scientists. Herman Pritchett’s “The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and 
Values 1937-1944” published in 1948 marks the start of supreme court analysis based 
on statistical models The most central question in this tradition of court behaviour 
within political science is how different factors influences the justice’s decisions and 
thereby the decisions of the courts as a whole. In this field of study there are four 
main theoretical frameworks: the Attitudinal model, the Legal model, the Strategic-
interaction model (which can be separated into the Internal-strategic model and the 
External-strategic model) and the Personal Traits model. These models differs both in 
about their assumptions of justices’ goals and how they try to achieve these goals. 
 
In basic terms the Attitudinal model assumes that cases are decided “in light of the 
facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices” (Segal 
and Spaeth 2002: 86). The legal model assumes that the “decisions of the court are 
substantially influenced by the facts of the case” in light of the formal sources of law 
(Segal and Spaeth 2002:48).  Both the internal-strategic model and the external-
strategic model are founded on rational choice theory. The internal-strategic model 
tries to explain how a justice acts towards other justices to achieve his or her goals, 
most often relating to specific cases or specific areas of the law. The external-strategic 
on the other hand deals with how either the justice or court as a whole interacts with 
other government institutions, most importantly the national legislature and the 
executive, and how these relationships might influence court decisions. The personal 
traits model assumes that factors such as gender, age, prior professional carer etc. 
could influence how the justice vote in specific cases or in cases involving a common 
element. These models are not clearly defined, and some of the models have much in 
common. It is for instance difficult to clearly separate the attitudinal model and the 
personal traits model since it is obvious that traits such as former work experience can 
influence both the ideological and judicial viewpoints of a justice.  
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Most approaches agree that the available legal sources and the facts of the case are 
central to how the justices reach their conclusions. To what degree justices are 
constrained by the legal sources is however disputed. The following paragraphs aims 
to focus deeper on the legal model and the attitudinal model, including both where 
they significantly differ and where there is common ground between the theories. 
 
3.1 The Legal Model 
 
The Legal model supports a legalists interpretation of judicial behaviour where the 
most important aspect of any case if the law itself. It’s by understanding the law one 
can understand court decisions and the justices use objective and apolitical methods 
when applying the law
22
 (Epstein and Jacobi 2010:342-343). A rather simplistic view 
of the legal model is that “a judge makes policy by resolving legal disputes, [...], by 
deciding cases that present themselves as bundles of facts (Lax 2007:591). By this 
somewhat naïve interpretation of the legal model one can expect that there is a correct 
(legal) answer to the question at hand, which can be found by a mechanical use of the 
law. (Segal and Spaeth 2002:48).   
 
This view has been criticised by many (i.e. Friedman (2006) who argue that such a 
presentation of the school of thought is antiquated especially because it gives a false 
impression that the justices are more strictly bound by precedent than they really are. 
Kritzer and Richards (2005:33) among others think that this simplistic view of the 
legal model, often put forward by those who support the attitudinal model, gives a 
false impression of the legal model, and they claim that the model is more 
sophisticated and nuanced. Segal and Spaeth’s interpretation of the legal model is a 
“straw person” according to Rosenberg (1994:7), and he claims their many results 
based on the attitudinal model could also been found by analysis based on a correct 
understanding on the legal model.  
 
According to Cross, the legal “model suggests that the path of law can be identified 
through reasoned analysis of factors internal to the law” Cross (1997:255). 
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 An example of this is the three aforementioned “guidelines” used within Norwegian law when 
encountering contradictive law 
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According to Brisbin (1996:1004) the legal model implies “that judicial votes result 
from the application of use of professional interpretative techniques, or modes of 
reasoning from legal principles as taught in law schools, to the interpretation of 
various sorts of legal texts”. Most central in this approach is a rather strict adherence 
to the relevant law, the intent of the framers of law and prior precedent in light of the 
case
23
 (Richards and Kritzer 2002:305). 
 
The legal theory has undergone some changes to increase its practical applicability, 
most noteworthy is a divergence from a more strict mechanical view, and acceptance 
that judicial ideology does influence judicial outcomes (Tiller and Cross 2006:520). 
Newer school of thought within the legal model tradition, examples of which are the 
school of Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies recognize the judicial ideology 
factor as significant to the opinion of the justice
24
 (Tiller and Cross 1999:217).  
 
Askeland argues that the Norwegian Supreme Court follows a legal realism model, 
evolved from a more formalistic approach (Askeland 2003).  Chief Justice Schei 
states that there is general consensus within the Norwegian Legal system that the 
justices are influenced by social environment they themselves are a part of. (Schei 
2011:17-18). That is not the same as saying that they accept a model more related to 
the Attitudinal model, Skoghøy points to that it is fully possible to reach different 
conclusions in the same case while adhering to the law if the legal sources does not 
provide a clear legal answer in the specific case. (Skoghøy 2011a,:713). This is also 
logical, if a case has a clear judicial outcome based on law or precedent there is little 
reason why the case should be heard by the Supreme Court. But as Segal and Speath 
point out, “by being able to explain ‘everything’, in the end it explains nothing”. If 
strict use legal model can lead to different results that are equally judicially 
justifiable, then the model (at least on its own) can’t serve as an explanation for 
supreme court decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002:86). 
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 Which coincides with what many refer to as the formal sources of law (as in Norway) 
24
 The most clear case of a consistent use of judicial ideology in the American Supreme Court can 
probably be seen in the writings by Justices Scalia and Thomas who are proponents of constitutional 
originalism 
 27 
Another criticism of the legal model is based on the premise of the institution of the 
Supreme Court as the highest appellate court; “clear cases do not represent a 
significant share of the disputes actually adjudicated by judicial bodies, legal rules 
cannot be a major determinant of judicial behaviour” (Dyevre 2010, 312).  All in all 
the Legal Model serves as part of the explanation of how justices vote, but the model 
seems too restricted when it does not take into account non-legal factors that to a 
smaller or larger extent influence how justices vote.  
 
3.2 The Attitudinal Model  
 
The attitudinal model traces its roots to the legal realist movement of the 1920s, led 
by among others Karl Llewellyn and Jermoe Frank. It was seen as a reaction against 
the traditional orthodox view that held that the judge’s personal views were irrelevant. 
Llewellyn wrote that the first principle of legal realism is the “conception of law in 
flux, of moving law, and of judicial creation of law” (1931:1227). Within this 
framework the justice’s decisions can be viewed as a “a function of what they prefer 
to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what they 
perceive is feasible to do” (Gibson 1983:9). A strict interpretation of the model 
suggests that the political attitude of the judge is the most important factor in how the 
justice will vote when such attitudes are relevant. (Songer and Siripurapu 2009:66). 
This suggestion stands in contrast to the legal model where it is suggested that the law 
has a constraining influence on the justice and it is not legally justifiable to reach 
decisions not based formal law (Friedman 2006, 264). 
 
Segal and Spaeth point to four institutional freedoms U.S. Supreme Courts Justices 
enjoy which increases their sphere of freedom to such a degree that one can expect the 
justices to engage in “rational sincere behaviour”, which is a prerequisite of the 
Attitudinal Model. The justices “can further their policy goals because they lack 
electoral or political accountability, have no ambitions for higher office, and 
comprise a court of last resort and that controls its own caseload” (2002:92). From a 
principal-agent the justice (agent) becomes independent of the principal (in the case 
of Norway the sitting government cabinet) after they are selected to serve as justice. 
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Therefore, according to Rehder (2007: 12) the most important variable for explaining 
judicial behaviour is the justices’ personal preferences.  
 
Since Supreme Court justices normally are very well educated, with an abundance of 
prior experience it reasonable to assume that the “justices come to the Supreme Court 
with their ideological preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual case facts 
these preferences cast overwhelming influence on their decision making” (Unah and 
Hancock 2006:296). This is too say that one should not expect a justice to change his 
or attitudes about judicial policy when becoming a Supreme Court justice
25
 This leads 
to an important implication; if one were to change the justices, one should expect 
different outcomes in similar cases, and thereby changes in judicial policy.  
The attitudinal model also implies that the people who appoint justices have a vested 
interest in choosing the justices that are more likely to support their agenda. (Dyevre 
2010:301).  
 
In addition to concepts based on legal realism, the attitudinal model encompasses 
concepts from political science, psychology and economics (Segal and Spath 
2002:86.) Pritchett’s aforementioned work marked the start of court analysis based 
political science, and with that data collection and model structuring based on 
observable data (i.e.. solely the outcome of the case) and not (to some degree 
necessarily) vague interpretations of the written verdict.  
 
The influence of psychology can clearly be seen in the attitudinal model. Spaeth and 
defined an attitude as an “intercorrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation” 
(2002:91).  According to Spaeth, two interacting attitudes are needed for a social 
action to occur. One is the attitude object; the direct and indirect parties to the case 
and an attitude situation, the central legal issue of the case (2002:91). Another related 
view of how a justice acts was formulated by Maltzman et al. and states that “the 
attitudinal model continues to view the votes of the justices as shaped by forces (in 
particular, preferences) exogenous to the strategic context of the Court. Second, the 
attitudinal approach continues to view individuals as the analytical building blocks 
and outcomes as the aggregated preferences of the Court majority.” (2000:12), 
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 This is separated from other aspects of being a justice, such as tactical voting or bowing to clear and 
overwhelmingly supported precedent.  
 29 
The economic influence on the attitudinal model can mostly be seen in how 
rationality is used by the justices. A central concept here is the goal of the justice 
when casting their vote.  Justices are as every actor in a political situation outcome-
orientated, and when having to choose one of several alternatives “they pick the 
alternative that perceive will yield them the greatest net benefit in terms of their 
goals” (Segal and Spaeth 2002:92) For the justices these goals are policy goals 
determined by the policy questions that are brought before the court. How a justice 
can act to achieve their policy goals is to a large extent restricted by the “rules of the 
game” described by Rhode and Spaeth as “the various formal and informal rules and 
norms within the framework of which decisions are made” (Segal and Spaeth 
2002:92). 
 
A central criticism against the attitudinal model from the perspective of the legal 
model is the attitudinal model doesn’t take into consideration the judicial limitations 
on their freedom. (Benesh et al. 2007:756). Though also elected legislators endure 
institutional limitations, the limitations for justices are stricter and can be further 
expected to influence the behaviour of the justices. (Benesh et al.2007). Research 
conducted by Wahlbeck et al. suggest that though ideology influences the willingness 
of a justice to dissent, this most be seen in connection with other factors such as the 
complexity of the case and not as a action to promote policy goals (Wahlbeck et al 
1999) 
 
As mentioned before, it can be hard to clearly distinguish between the attitudinal 
model and the personal traits model. Traditionally the attitudinal model was reluctant 
to include personal traits, which was viewed as a more indirect link to voting 
behaviour (Gibson 1983,Tate 1981). This stance has since evolved, and Brace and 
Hall (1995:11) identify personal traits to having a direct influence on voting 
behaviour. Though there are many who still view these models as separate, there 
seems to be little or no theoretical or practical reason too do so. The thesis will not 
separate the two models, and both personal traits and individual preferences will be 
included under a general attitudinal model. 
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3.3 The Strategic Interaction Model 
 
Separate, but clearly related to other models of judicial behaviour is the strategic 
interaction model. This model is mostly based on rational choice theory, which views 
justices as rational goal-oriented actors. This model can be traced back to the works of 
Schubert, Pritchett and Murphy from the early 1960s. This field of approach has first 
become more relevant during later years, and from the early 2000s strategic 
explanation of judicial behaviour has become dominant in Supreme Court decisional 
analysis
26
, and that there is evidence for strategic behaviour in several different 
contexts (Epstein and Jacobi 2010; Hettinger et al. 2004:124). There is suggestion in 
empirical evidence that strategic aspects of judicial decision-making can explain 
behaviour not otherwise being explained by neither by the legal model or the 
attitudinal model (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004:124).  
 
Central to the strategic model is the concept of interdependency. Bartels (2009: 474) 
points to the role of institutions when he wrote “legislators, judges, bureaucrats, 
voters and other actors make decisions within an institutional context defined by 
formal and informal rules that constrain individual discretion and ultimately shape 
actors’ choices”. Supreme Court justices don’t cast their vote in a vacuum, the 
influence and are influenced by other justices. And justices need support from other 
justices to further their policy goals. Those who support the strategic model place 
greater emphasis on institutional constraints than attitudinalists. This distinction is 
however unclear as the justices themselves can put restraints on the action of the 
court, thereby not technically contradicting the idea of a large sphere of freedom 
attitudinalists claim that justices enjoy. Supporters of the strategic model and 
supporters of the attitudinal model would probably agree that “despite the importance 
of ideology, the collegial context in which judges decide cases has a significant effect 
on how their preferences are expressed” (Meinke and Scott 2007:909). 
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 According to Epstein and Knight (2000: 652) the field of judicial politics was undergoing a “sea 
change” 
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The strategic model can as before mentioned be divided into two main categories the 
internal-strategic model and the external-strategic model
27
 (Dyevre 2010). The 
internal-strategic model can be seen as a rational choice game where the goal of the 
justice is to gather enough support for their policy goal. Therefore the institutional 
aspect of the supreme court becomes essential and the justices become constrained by 
the institutional environment that they are in (Gillman and Clayton 1999 cited in 
Dyevre 2010, 302). This is especially true for courts with a high degree of 
deliberation, which is “fundamentally about deciding what the court should do: is it 
aimed at persuading fellow Justices or being persuaded by them to agree on a 
common action” (Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, 1697) 
 
The first, and very often the only relevant of such constraints is based on whom of the 
other justices precedes in the case.
28
 The aggregate of the panel of justices in the 
specific case determine the outcome of the case, which is true for any court where the 
judicial outcome is based on majority voting. This sub-group of the institutional 
internalist model is known as panel effect theory. Substantial research on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court suggest that such panel effects are of 
great relevance for analysing judicial decisions (Kastellec 2011, Meinke and Scott 
2007).  On inherent weakness with such research, is that “any account of judicial 
decision-making in terms of collegial interactions and internal strategies is bound to 
remain speculative” Dyevre (2010:303) because none of the deliberations are public 
and justices very rarely discuss these deliberations outside of the Court. This focus on 
privacy within the court can also be clearly seen in the Norwegian Supreme Court.  
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 Also known as the Institutional Internalist Model and the Institutional Externalist Model, the latter 
will not be further utilized in this thesis. 
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 There can also be several other internal institutional constraints, and even unwritten and internal 
norms can have great effect on judicial outcomes, but such traits are not general and they specific to 
each court.  
 
 32 
Chapter 4 - The State Friendly Hypothesis 
 
The state friendly hypothesis in short holds that the state wins more than what can be 
reasonably expected. This notion is supported by the over all win rate for the state, 
which wins 60 to 80 percent of the cases, depending on the area of the law (Kjønstad 
1999:9 and Grendstad et al. 2011b). Most legal scholars see a state friendly nature 
exhibited if the court and its justices place greater emphasis one the interest of the 
state and thereby give less consideration to private interests than what follows from 
the legal doctrine (Kjønstad 1999:103; Tellesbø 2006:67). One important distinction 
is that state friendly nature refers to the state system as a whole, not whether a judge 
favours the incumbent government.   
 
4.1 Empirical research on the State Friendliness of Norwegian Supreme Court  
 
The vast majority of empirical research on the Norwegian Supreme Court years where 
mostly carried out by legal scholars up until recent years. Most of the empirical 
analysis’ can be said to be lacking in terms of statistical ambition and complexity.  
 
The first major analytical work to deal with voting patterns in the Supreme Court was 
“Dommeratferd i dissenssaker” by former Court of Appeals (Lagmannsrett) judge and 
Cand. Jur. Henry Østlid in 1988. The book mapped and analysed justices’ dissent 
behaviour in cases from 1930 to 1979. His study was founded upon a questionnaire 
dealing with the justices’ social and professional background and their attitudes 
towards some important questions in society. He found that the voting pattern often 
matched the assumed party-political or ideological attitudes of the justice (based on 
the questionnaire) in specific cases and groups of cases.  
 
After Østlid’s publication, the debate over voting behaviour in the Norwegian 
Supreme Court was virtually non-existent for over a decade. A limited debate among 
some legal scholars started in 1999, and a few relevant articles were published in law 
publications during the following years. These contributions lacked thorough 
statistical analysis and are more theoretically interesting because of the assumptions 
the writers made as opposed to the their actual findings.  
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With regards to analysis, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Jan Skåre 
published an analysis of the connection between former workplace and vote in 
dissenting cases from 1978 to 1998. The analysis was only descriptive, and Skåre 
found no such significant connection. Another descriptive study was conducted by 
Law Professor Asbjørn Kjønstad in 1999. He found a link between voting for the state 
and previous employment at the Legislation Department. 
 
One of the interesting assumptions that were made is that the state is more likely to 
win because of the strength of the state’s legal resources compared to more limited 
private legal resources (Fagernæs 2007:54; Tellesbø 2006:77). In general this 
assumption is probably true, but the picture is more nuanced. While for instance the 
various government departments enjoy near unlimited resources in their court cases, 
the same cannot be said for the various municipalities. The resources of the private 
parties are also unevenly divided, it is for instance likely that “big business” (the most 
relevant example in Norway are oil companies) can match the professional expertise 
of the state and will have few economic problems pursuing cases. Such “big business” 
cases are often tax related, and within this area of the law, the win rate for the state is 
lower based in part because of more evenly divided resources (Tellesbø 2006:77). 
Other private parties are more restrained by the high costs of pursuing a case, and it is 
likely that a cost-benefit analysis can lead private parties to not pursue relatively 
strong cases to the Supreme Court
29
, because of the risk of having to pay the 
opposition’s legal fees.  
 
In recent years there’s been more research on the voting behaviour of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court with a greater emphasis on statistics that has been carried out by 
Gunnar Grendstad, William R. Shaffer and Eric N. Waltenburg.  
 
In the article Revealed Preferences of Norwegian Supreme Court Justices (2010), 
Grendstad et al. empirically tested the connection between the justices’ ideology and 
their voting behaviour. Using a bivariate correlation analysis they found that 37.9% of 
the variation with regards to public vs. private interests could be explained by whether 
or not a justice was appointed by a social-democratic government or a non-social-
                                                        
29
 Which might lead to an artificially high win rate for the state due to that the state will pursue every 
where the court might find in their favor. 
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democratic government (2010: 96).  The article concluded that the results confirms 
the traditional view that social-democratic governments place greater emphasis on the 
interests of the society or community, whereas non-social-democratic governments is 
more open to protect the interest of the individual. It should however be mentioned 
that the results was based on analysing just 11 cases.  
 
In the article When Justices Disagree. The Influence of Ideology and Geography on 
Economic Voting on the Norwegian Supreme Court (2011a), Grendstad et al. 
analysed 63 cases with dissenting opinions related to economic issues from the year 
2000 to 2007. The method that was utilized here was a multivariate regression 
analysis. The results showed that justices appointed by social-democratic 
governments was 23,5% more likely to vote in favour of the government than justices 
appointed by non-social-democratic governments (2011a: 15,16). In the article Public 
Economic Interests vs. Private Economic Rights: Preferential Voting on the 
Norwegian Supreme Court, 1948-2011 from 2012 Grendstad et al. analysed the effect 
between appointing government and justices voting pattern in economic cases in the 
period between 1948 to 2011 using a multivariate regression analysis. Here they 
found that a justice appointed by a social-democratic government was 30% more 
likely to vote in favour of the party representing the public.  
 
The master thesis’ of Jon-Kåre Skiple and Terje Jacobsen included multilevel models 
and they both found significant results regarding the composition of the court. Skiple 
(2012) found that justices that voted in homogenous social democratic panels where 
more likely to vote for the State compared to when they voted in panels with other 
compositions of appointing government. Jacobsen (2012) found a positive effect on 
state friendly voting in panels composed of a majority of justices with a background 
in the Legislation Department. These results suggest that a multilevel model should be 
considered.  
 
The next table gives an overview of the numerous hypotheses this thesis will test. It is 
structured into three level, justice, case and panel and the hypotheses will be 
discussed in that order.  
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Table 2: Overview Hypotheses 
Variable Justice  
Appointing government 
H1: Justices appointed by social-democratic government are more 
likely to vote in favour of the state than justices appointed 
by non-social-democratic governments.  
  
Government Advocate 
H2: Former employment at the Office of the Government 
Advocate increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state 
  
Office of Public Prosecution 
H3: Former employment at the Office of the Director General of 
Public Prosecutions increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the 
state 
  
Legislation Department 
H4: Former employment at the Legislation Department 
increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state. 
  
Born in Oslo 
H5: Justices born in Oslo are more state friendly  
than justices not born in Oslo.  
  
Law Professor 
H6: Former Law Professors are less likely to  
vote in favour of the state 
  
 
Case  
Government Advocate 
H7: The presence of the Government Advocate or someone 
from his office increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state 
  
Case type 
H8: The effect of the ideology of the justice varies between  
cases with different characteristics.  
  
 
Panel  
Homogeneous Soc. Dem 
H9: The likelihood for voting for the state increases if the case  
is heard by a panel of justices consisting only of  
social democratic appointees  
  
Majority non-Soc. Dem. 
H10: The likelihood of voting for the state decreases of the panel  
consists a majority of justices not appointed  
by social democratic governments  
  
Majority Legislation 
Department 
H11: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel  
consists of a majority of justices who have previously worked  
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in the Legislation Department. 
  
Majority Government 
Advocate 
 
H12: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel 
consists of a majority of justices who have previously worked in 
the Office of the Government Advocate 
  
Majority born in Oslo 
H13: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel  
consists of a majority of justices were born in Oslo 
 
4.2 Hypotheses on the Individual Level 
 
Based on the findings of Grendstad et al. in the mentioned articles and on the most 
basic claim in the additional model one can expect that that the likelihood for a 
justices to vote for or against the state is statistically connected to whether a justice 
was appointed by a social-democratic- or non-social-democratic government.  
 
Such an expectation is founded on the prerequisite that the government has the final 
say in the appointment process, as it has in Norway. Former Prime Minister Kåre 
Willoch has stated that governments have used this power to intentionally appoint 
ideologically likeminded justices. Willoch (2002:124) exemplifies this claim with the 
outcome of Kløftadommen (Rt. 1976-1), which was a major case dealing with 
expropriation. The case, dealt with in plenary session was decided 10-7 against the 
state, and Willoch argues that this was because of the strategic appointments made by 
the Borten government in the six years leading up to the decision. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Justices appointed by social-democratic governments are more likely to vote in 
favour of public interests represented by the state than justices appointed by non-
social-democratic governments.  
 
The fundamental claim of the attitudinal model is that the preferences of the justices, 
which are shaped by personal characteristics, prior legal experience etc. influences 
their votes as Supreme Court justices. Previous legal career has been suggested by 
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among others Kjønstad (1999) and tested by Grendstad et al. (2011b) as a possible 
reason for why a justice may be more or less state friendly in his or her voting.  
 
Especially three prior occupations are here appropriate to test; experience from the 
Legislation Department (Lovavdelingen) which is the expert judicial division under 
the Department of Justice, experience as working for the Office of the Government 
Advocate (Regjeringsadvokaten) which handles civilian cases for the central 
government and the Office of the Director General of Public Prosecutions 
(Statsadvokat) or having been the Director General of Public Prosecutions 
(Riksadvokat) which handles the state’s more serious criminal cases.  
 
These occupations are interesting for two reasons. Firstly, these occupations are 
perhaps the most sought after and prestigious governmental judicial positions
30
 within 
the state, and therefore serves one of clearest paths to the highest court for aspiring 
Supreme Court justices. Secondly, due to their nature (taking the position of the state 
in all cases) these occupations are apt to create a pro state view both with regards to 
how to view judicial questions and how they should be answered. 
 
H2: Former employment as the Director General Office of the Government Advocate 
increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state 
 
H3: Former employment at the Office of the Director General of Public Prosecutions 
increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state. 
 
One reason for why working in the Legislation Department is especially apt to create 
conditions for future state friendly bias is according to former justice Skåre (1997) in 
the nature of the work. Work in the Legislation Department is mostly of a technical 
nature where as a jurist you have little room view to the real world implications of the 
work. There is also little or no connection to the person(s) that are affected by a 
decision as one would get in most other law occupations. The technical nature of the 
work combined with viewing judicial questions from the point of view of the state is 
likely to create a strong pro state bias.  
                                                        
30
 The Legislation Department can be considered to be a very important position early in the career of 
a jurist aiming to be a future judge.  
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H4: Former employment at the Legislation Department increases the likelihood of 
voting in favour of the state. 
 
Where a justice was born and presumably grew up is also expected to influence how 
state friendly a justice is. Grendstad et al. (2011c:10) tested the effect of the centre-
periphery dimension, and found such a factor to be a potential extra-legal factor that 
can influence decisions. The potential effect of the centre-periphery dimension is 
caused by the fact that the vast majority of Norway’s governmental legal elite is 
concentrated in Oslo (Shaffer, Grendstad, and Waltenburg 2011:18). The expected 
effect is that justices born in Oslo are more likely to vote for state interests. 
 
H5: Justices born in Oslo are more state friendly than justices not born in Oslo.  
 
Law professors are in a special position when it comes to how they view and evaluate 
the law. A large part of this occupation is analysing and teaching how and why the 
Supreme Court the Supreme Court reach their conclusions and how this corresponds 
to former decisions and how one should view a law or principle. This often leads to a 
focus on criticism of verdicts and judicial arguments, which is not common to the 
same extent within other law occupations Such critique can of course be directed at 
decisions in favour of or against the state. But there are some “faults” from the point 
of view of law professors that the party representing the state are more likely to 
commit. Procedural faults and other minor infractions are more often committed by 
the state than private parties. Law professors are also concerned with if central 
principles are upheld, i.e. Grunnloven §§ 96 and 97, the right of an individual to be 
heard in due time before a decision that can affect them is taken etc. This focus on 
analysing and criticising the Supreme Court and a more rigid view on technical 
correctness is a factor that can lead former law professors to be less inclined to vote in 
favour of the state. This leads to: 
 
H6: Former Law Professors are less likely to vote in favour of the state 
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4.3 Hypotheses on the Case Level 
 
It is assumed that the state is more likely to win cases of greater importance. A 
measurement of how important a case is to the state is who is chosen to represent the 
state before the Supreme Court. Since the Government Advocate is the highest legal 
representative for the state in civilian cases, his presence or the presence from his 
representatives would indicate that the case is of great importance. Research on U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the presence of the Solicitor General had an influence on 
the Court. The results of Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman (2005) and McAtee and 
McGuire (2007) suggest that the presence of the Solicitor General has an impact not 
only as the presumably one of the top legal experts of the country, but also through 
the political signals that are sent with his presence. The role of the Norwegian 
Government Advocate is quite similar to that of the U.S. Solicitor General, and 
therefore one can expect the same results. 
 
H7: The presence of the Government Advocates or someone from his office increases 
the likelihood of voting for the state 
 
Since Supreme Court cases are far from homogeneous, it is natural that the win-ratio 
for the state varies depending on what area of the law that’s the issue (Tellesbø 
2006:77). One can then also expect that some areas of the law are more likely to be 
decided by the justices’ ideology based on appointing government than others.  
 
This claim is based on the assumption that some areas of the law are more ideological 
in nature, for instance some areas of the law are more likely to involve substantial 
state interests, which according to Lund (1987:215) makes it unlikely that the 
majority ruling is in disfavour of the state. This claim is supported by research on the 
American Supreme Court, Bartels (2005) found that the effect of the ideology of the 
justice varied between cases with different characteristics. The cases are grouped into 
the following: Tax cases, other economic cases, expropriation cases, immigration and 
asylum law, family law, health-care cases administrative law and cases related to 
nature. 
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The expected impact of each of the different areas of law will here be described in 
more detail.  
 
Tax law encompasses many different forms of taxes including the value added tax, 
corporate tax, personal income tax, estate tax and inheritance tax. The main question 
in such cases is if private citizens or corporations owe the state taxes or not. The main 
disagreements is often over what tax rate is appropriate, if Norway or a municipality 
has the jurisdiction to collect the tax in question, if a service is subject to tax or for 
instance if a period of time is subject to be taxed or not. This is the area of law when 
one could expect the clearest ideological split among the justices. This is because it is 
clearly an important subject for the state since it has a monopoly on tax collection, 
and the outcome of cases influences the states revenue. In tax cases the private party 
often technically avoids the tax through loopholes that exist because of the vagueness 
of the law or situations that are not explicitly covered by the law. A question that 
often faces the justices is how much freedom a person or company has when it comes 
interpreting the letter of the law to their own advantage versus the overall intent of the 
law and tax system. 
 
The category other economic cases covers a wide array of different cases. One of the 
main subgroups is when the state either through wrongful actions or inaction has 
made the state guilty of something that requires reimbursement to a private party. In 
theory the same rules apply as if two private parties had a legal dispute, but a major 
difference is that the state is much more likely to be found responsible on objective 
grounds connected to areas of society where the state has monopoly
31
. Though more 
rare, the state suing a private party does at times occur for instance when private 
companies are responsible for community tasks i.e. building schools and the private 
party exceeds the timeframe or cost of the project. In these kinds of cases it is difficult 
to determine a theoretical expectation based on appointing government.  
 
Another category is expropriation cases, which simply put is cases where the state 
infringes on the private property of the individual with the goal of taking over the land 
or regulate the use of land. Many of these cases can be traced to Article 105 of the 
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 This applies for instance to damages following poor roads, too high noise levels around airports etc.  
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Constitution that states: “If the welfare of the State requires that any person shall 
surrender his movable or immovable property for the public use, he shall receive full 
compensation from the Treasury.”  In such cases there are three main sources of 
disagreement that the justices face; whether the procedures for such actions are 
followed correctly, if the faults were significant enough to invalidate the government 
decision and what constitutes “full compensation” in the specific case. An area 
regulated for housing is for instance more valuable than areas regulated for farming 
and there is often disagreement on how to determine the value of minerals or other 
natural resources on the land A more rare issue that at times invalidate government 
action is that the action is so unjust to the individual that expropriation is illegitimate 
because of his or her needs and affiliation to the land. In such cases it is also often 
unclear if the needs of society is considerable enough justify such encroachment on 
private property rights.  Since this area of the law often can be boiled down to a 
question of the needs of society versus private property rights it is clear that one can 
expect a clear difference between justices appointed by social democratic 
governments and justices appointed by non- social-democratic governments. 
 
When it comes to cases that deals primarily with immigration and asylum the main 
questions is whether the decisions of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 
(Utlendingsdirektoratet)
32
 was made according to both material and procedural rules. 
Cases are often related if to deportation of immigrants with established family life in 
Norway or if persons might face jail in countries where conditions are subpar
33
, is if a 
legal decision by Directorate of Immigration should be overturned because of the 
exceptional circumstances of the case. This clearly opens for value judgements where 
main considerations are the letter of the law and the needs and perception of society 
versus the rights and needs of the person(s) affected by the decision. If the appointing 
government is a determining factor from a statistical point of view (which is not very 
likely), the results should suggest that social democratic appointees are less inclined 
to overrule the directorate decision.  
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 The directorate is a part of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Justis- og 
beredskapsdepartementet) 
33
 This relates to both the general sanitary conditions and the risk of inhuman treatment 
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Based on theoretical assessments, one should expect justices appointed by social 
democratic governments to be less inclined to overrule (most often) local 
municipalities in administrative cases. These cases are generally of less importance 
than the other fields of law mentioned. Unlike the other areas of law, procedural faults 
are mostly overlooked if it cannot be proved that the faults had a determining effect 
on final decision of the authority making the decision.
34
 Because of this, the state’s 
win-rate in such cases is particularly high, but one should expect non-social 
democratic appointed justices to put more emphasis on correct procedure to secure to 
the rights of the individual while justices appointed by social democratic governments 
focus more on the effectiveness of local democracy.  
 
In cases related to family law, most often child custody cases, one can expect that 
justices from different appointing government have different views on how far private 
family life can be infringed upon and where the threshold for government interference 
via child services (Barnevernet) is. Justices appointed by social democratic 
governments are expected to be more approving of government interference on family 
life.  
 
Another area of law that will be analysed are cases that deals with health care. The 
assumption here is that justices appointed by non-social democratic governments 
would focus on that procedures and treatment must be in accordance with the 
guidelines. Justices appointed by social-democratic governments can be assumed to 
put more emphasis on the effectiveness of treatment centres, hospitals etc. as whole, 
and thereby be less strict with specific guidelines.  
 
The last area of law that will be tested are cases related to nature. The assumption is 
again that justices appointed by non-social democratic governments are more inclined 
to respect and protect private property rights compared to justices appointed by 
social-democrats governments. This discussion of different areas of the law leads to: 
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 The only clear procedural fault that almost always is deemed sufficient to nullify administrative 
decision is if the person(s) affected be the decision did not have the opportunity to give their views on 
the matter before the final decision was made.  
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H8: The effect of the ideology of the justice varies between cases with different 
characteristics.  
 
4.4 Hypotheses based on the Panel Effect Theory 
 
Explanatory variables connected specifically to the composition of the five-justice 
panels are included to test the collegial effects. Thought the cases in the Supreme 
Court are decided by the votes of the individual justice, the outcome of the cases are a 
result of coordination and collaboration according to Schei (2010:14). Kjønstad 
(1999:97) and Schei (2004:138) have eluded to that the legal context of the Court can 
impact the behaviour of the Norwegian justices and influence their votes.  
The recruitment base to the Supreme Court in terms of former workplace has 
broadened during recent years
35
, and a possible consequence of this is the increased 
ratio of judicial review performed by the court (Skoghøy 2011b:15). 
 
Empirical research done on American courts suggests that the environment the 
justices decide cases in influences their decisions (Meinke and Scott 2007). This 
research was conducted on rotating three justice panels in the Court of Appeals. This 
composition is not very different from the rotating five justice panels most widely 
used in the Norwegian Supreme Court. (Brown in Sunstein et al. 2006: 71). 
 
Based on appointing government the following hypothesis are established:  
 
H9: The likelihood for voting for the state increases if the case is heard by a panel of 
justices consisting only of social democratic appointees. 
 
H10: The likelihood of voting for the state decreases of the panel consists a majority 
of justices not appointed by social democratic governments  
 
The following hypotheses that are related to the composition of justices can been seen 
as a continuation of some of the hypotheses connected to the individual justice.  
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 More of the justice has experience from private law firms and limited or no experience from 
governmental agencies.  
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H11: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices who have previously worked in the Legislation Department. 
 
H12: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices who have previously worked in the Office of the Government Advocate 
 
H13: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices were born in Oslo. 
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Chapter 5 - Method  
 
To study the effects of ideology and other variables on the vote of the justices in the 
Supreme Court, a quantitative approach will be utilized. This approach follows a 
widely used tradition in studies on the American Supreme Court (i.e. Tate 1983, Segal 
et al. 1993, 2002, Kastellec 2011, Parker 2012) and on the Norwegian Supreme Court 
(i.e. Østlid 1988, Grendstad et al. 2010, 2011a, 2011b).  A prerequisite for this kind of 
methodical testing is the availability of the data regarding information about the 
justices, their votes, and information about the cases. This prerequisite is satisfied as a 
result of the establishment and expansion of the DORONAH database by Grendstad, 
Shaffer and Waltenburg. Therefore one can follow the recommendation Lijphart 
(1971:685) of applying statistical method instead of other alternatives.  
 
The main alternative
36
 to a quantitative analysis is to analyse the contents of the 
written verdicts. This is difficult since the justices can camouflage their real 
assessments and views in the sources of law (see Eckhoff 2001:375, Skoghøy 2010).   
 
5.1 Logistical Regression 
 
The dependant variable is dichotomous. The justices either vote in favour of the party 
representing the state or the party representing private interests. Because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, logistical regression will be utilized. The 
dependant variable and the vast majority of the other variables are dichotomous where 
each observation either has a value of 0 or 1. A linear model could take the fitted 
value beyond this restricted range, which could lead to a model that gives little 
meaning.  
 
In the model that will be utilized
37
 the coefficients will be shown as log odds. The 
direction of the coefficients can be interpreted straight forward, where a positive 
effect indicates an increase in likelihood for voting for the state whereas a negative 
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 Another possibility though only possible in theory would be to somehow analyse the deliberative 
voting process before the final vote.  
37
 The Stata command that will used is the logit function 
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effect signals a decrease in the likelihood of voting for the state. A conventional 
method for a more intuitive interpretation of the log-odds is to estimate odds by 
exposing the coefficient and calculating the corresponding likelihood for that the 
dependant variable is 1 (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2008: 235). The Stata command margins 
will be utilized in the analysis to estimate the predicted likelihood for voting in favour 
of the party representing the state.  The odds ratio of a variable will also be given  
 
AIC estimates will be used to determine how well the model fits compared to the 
other models. The AIC
38
 (Akaike information criterion) test is not an absolute test 
since it does not indicate how good a model is in the absolute sense, but the AIC 
indicates how well the model fits the data and the estimated parameters (Hox 2010: 
50-51). A lower AIC score indicates a better model, but a factor that must be 
considered is that the AIC can increase because of added variables. Wald tests will be 
utilized to determine if a singe variable or a group of variables should be kept for 
further analysis or if the variable(s) should be tossed out.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Challenges 
 
Each vote of a justice in the will be treated as a unique observation, which is the 
conventional way of treating observation when studying judicial behaviour. But this 
approach neglects the possibility of that the vote a justice can correlate with other 
votes given by the same justice in other cases.  
 
The statistical approach will not take into consideration the time dimension as a 
relevant factor. This could be problematic according to Grendstad et al. (2011b:29). A 
potential problem stems from the fact that the Supreme Court hears different cases 
with different characteristics from year to year (Sunde 2012). The Supreme Court also 
often hears several cases related to the same law, paragraph or principle during a short 
period of time
39, after which the particular area a law is “settled” for a longer or 
shorter time period. Some of these particular questions are more political in nature 
and more often than other judicial question leads to dissent, which a condition for 
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 BIC scores will also be included. 
39
 This is especially true for new laws or changed laws 
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being included in this study. An example of this is that 11 cases are included from 
1998 and 2008, while only 2 cases are included from 1994.  
5.3 Arguments for a Hierarchical Model  
 
There are several arguments for why the use of multilevel analysis is worth exploring.  
A multilevel analysis is according to Hox and Roberts (2011:4) a statistical model for 
data that consists of two or more distinct hierarchical levels. Most social processes 
involve interaction between the individual and groups of people. The Norwegian 
Supreme Court involves this kind of social process, and the voting process is by its 
nature hierarchical. Because of this hierarchy it can be useful to use a multilevel data 
model that captures the effects of hierarchy in one model. 
 
 The theoretical framework, and the panel effect theory in particular opens for that 
variation in the votes of the justices can be explained by variables on both the 
individual- and case-level. A multilevel model allows the variables to be analysed on 
their “correct” level in the data structure, which helps avoid ecological fallacy 
(Steenbergen et al. 2002:219). Another methodical argument for the use of a 
multilevel analysis is that multilevel models allows for units within the same nested 
group to correlate with each other. Multilevel models have as mentioned be used 
sucuessfully by other students at the University of Bergen who have analysed the 
Norwegian Supreme Court.  
 
An efficient test on whether or not a multilevel model is appropriate is to view the 
interclass correlation (ICC) in the empty model. The ICC that varies between 0 and 1 
tells how much of the variation in the dependant variable that can be explained by 
unobserved characteristics in the group structure. Theall, Scribner, Lynch, Simonsen, 
Schonlau, Carlin and Cohen (2008: 5) argue that an ICC of two percent or more 
indicates a group structure that is worth testing in a multilevel analysis.  
 
The empty model test
40
 of the selected dissenting cases showed that there is no ICC, 
and that all of the variation in the dependant variable can be explained in the observed 
data in the selected explanatory and control variables.  Because of the lack of ICC, 
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 Using the Stata function xtlogit 
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there is no point of applying a multilevel model in the analysis. The variables that will 
hurt the most from the lack of a multilevel model are the variables connected to the 
panel, since the nesting of groups is irrelevant in standard logistical regression.  
 
Even thought a multilevel level will not be used, the terms level one and two will be 
used to separate between predicators that are directly connected to a justice, whereas 
the level two applies to the predicators that are connected to the case or panel  
 
5.4 The Structure of the Model 
 
The following section will explain the structure of the model in the analysis chapter.  
 
Step 1: The effect of ideology on the individual level 
The first step is to test the effect of appointing government on the vote of the justices 
in dissenting cases in a bivariate model. The reason for this first step where only 
appointing government the only included variable is to illuminate H1: Justices 
appointed by social-democratic government are more likely to vote in favour of the 
state than justices appointed by non-social-democratic governments.  
 
Step: 2 Inclusion of the other justice predicators 
The next step is to include all explanatory and control variables on level one in a 
multivariate model There will be two multivariate models, one which only includes 
the explanatory variables and one where the control variables are also included. This 
will test both the effect and significance of the explanatory variables or any of the 
control variables. The inclusion of the other variables will also show if and how the 
appointing government variable changes. This step will cover 2 to 6. 
Wald tests will be then be used to create a condensed model of variables on level one.  
 
Step 3: Inclusion of level two variables. 
The third step is expanding the condensed model with case and panel predicators. 
Firstly the explanatory variables on level two will be tested before the control 
variables are included. This expansion will test if any of the new variables are 
statistically significant and how the newly included variables influence the effect and 
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significance of the existing variables. This step will cover hypotheses 7 to 13. A new 
and final condensed model will then be created, based on the Wald scores of the 
variables from the multivariate model.  
 
Step 4: Testing the effect of different areas of law 
The multivariate models are not very likely to illuminate the effect of different areas 
of the law to any large extent. Therefore it is necessary to include a predicted 
likelihood test to give a more in-depth view of how justices from different appointing 
governments. This will hopefully give relevant information to H8: The effect of the 
ideology of the justice varies between cases with different characteristics.  
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Chapter 6 - Data Chapter 
 
This chapter will present the source of the selected data, the framework of the analysis 
and the operationalization of the variables. The framework of analysis deals with what 
kind of cases that will be included and the reasoning for setting these limitations. 
Explanatory variables will be outlined in order of their placement and inclusion in the 
data structure. The explanatory variables will be discussed in detail regarding 
expected direction The control variables will be discussed in less detail, but expected 
direction and some theoretical justification will be mentioned for some these 
variables. The name given to the variables in the model will be mentioned in in an 
overview table at the end of this chapter.  
 
6.1 Source of Data 
 
The data that will be utilized in this thesis will be based on information stored in the 
Doranoh database created by Gunnar Grendstad, William Shaffer and Eric 
Waltenburg (2012a). The Doranoh database consists of information about the 
Supreme Court cases, the votes of justices and information about the justices in the 
time period 1945 to 2012.  
 
The data regarding cases and votes in the Doranoh database is based on information 
found on Lovdata. Lovdata is a website and database which publishes judicial 
information. The free version of the website includes among other things the vast 
majority of Norwegian law, preoperational notes to the laws and the newest Supreme 
Court cases. The subscription service offers in addition the most complete online 
library of Supreme Court cases found in Norway and advanced search tools. The 
subscription version is widely used by practitioners of law and law students in 
Norway 
 
Overall the data is reliable since it based on objective quantifications of published 
judicial decisions. The Lovdata database is however not designed to be used for 
statistical empirical research. Examples of this are for instance inconsistent 
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terminology
41
 and different layouts of the written verdicts from different time periods 
when it comes to court decisions. Though Lovdata is the most complete database for 
Supreme Court cases, there are some gaps. These gaps are mostly connected to 
criminal cases dated 1990 and prior.  The database is nearly complete when it comes 
to civil cases, though several transcripts of verdicts from before 1950 are missing or 
incomplete.  
 
The next section of the data chapter will present the framework of the analysis. 
 
6.2 Civil Cases 
 
This thesis will only analyse civil cases. There are several reasons for this choice. 
Most criminal cases reaching the Supreme Court deal with technical questions about 
procedure, discussions about the applicability of a certain article of the criminal code 
or the severity of the punishment etc. It’s unlikely that ideology based appointing 
government is a relevant factor in such cases.  
 
As stated by the current Chief Justice Tore Schei, most civil cases that reaches the 
Supreme Court are questionable in the sense that one more factors makes the outcome 
of the case uncertain (Schei 2011, 2012). This point has to be seen in connection with 
the role of the Supreme Court and the case selection process. The Appeals Section of 
the Supreme Court has complete discretion when it comes approving a case for 
further deliberations or outright dismissing the appeal. The role of the Supreme Court 
is to serve as the highest appellate court and it’s therefore natural to believe that only 
the appeals from questionable cases are granted. If the Appeals Section doesn’t have 
any reason to question the validity of the verdict from lower courts there’s no reason 
to grant an appeal and granting such appeals will unnecessary increase the caseload of 
the Supreme Court. 
 
                                                        
41
 An example of inconsistency is that the terms “dissens” (dissent) and “mindretall” (minority) are 
both used, though these terms describe the same thing.  
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Simply put, there’s a reason why the Supreme Court chooses a case. The main 
reasons are that a case is complex, of great importance, of controversial nature or a 
decision will have great ramifications beyond the specific case in question.  
The only requirement to be included in the analysis regarding the litigants in the case 
is that one of the parties represents state interests. The term state interests includes in 
addition to cases where the central government or various governmental departments 
and directorates are litigants, county councils (fylkeskommune) and municipalities 
(kommuner) since they also represents societal interests. Cases where both litigants 
represent state interests are excluded.  
 
6.3 Dissenting Cases 
 
The analysis in this thesis will be based on cases where there is disagreement among 
the justices regarding the outcome of the cases. According to Skoghøy (2010:720) 
dissenting cases are “cases where within the framework of the accepted sources of 
law it is possible to argue for different outcomes, and it is reasonable to expect that 
the votes in such cases will contribute to undercover the justices inclination to 
prioritize different interests.” This statement by Skoghøy might be a little too 
simplistic since it basically states that dissents occur since it possible to argue for 
different outcomes, which is the case in all cases, or else there would be little 
reason for the Supreme Court to take on a case.  But since the justices disagree in 
dissenting cases it reasonable to assume that there isn’t a clear answer to the 
question(s) in the case based on the sources of law. Another possibility is that the 
sources of law are clear, but contradictory and can be interpreted differently. When 
justices face such situations it is reasonable to assume that the personal attitudes
42
 of a 
justice influences his or her vote.  
 
There are several different forms or degrees of dissent. The most clear-cut is when 
there are two or more opinions that differ in regards to the winner of the case. Another 
form of dissent is when two or more opinions differ with regards to legal arguments, 
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 One cannot however automatically assume that it is the ideology of the justice the influences the 
vote. Other attitudes such as what the justice believes is most coherent with other laws can determine 
the vote.  
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but the winner of the case is identical despite the different legal approaches to the 
case. The last main form of dissent is when the opinions are identical with regards to 
the winner of the case and arguments, but the opinions argue for different 
consequences i.e. lesser or more severe punishment in criminal cases or how much or 
what percentage a business needs to pay in taxes. The analysis will only consist of 
cases that include one or more opinion(s) that dissent on the main question  (winner of 
the case). 
 
6.4 Five-justice Panel and Time Period 
 
Only cases decided in five-justice panels (avdeling) are included in the analysis. Since 
the amount of cases deliberated in Grand Chamber or in plenary session is very low, 
their absence should not have an impact on the variables. A consequence of the 
exclusion is that any conclusion is only applicable to a five-justice panel.  
 
The time period of the analysis is from 1991 to 2012. The reason for why 1991 is set 
as the starting point is that Carsten Smith
43
 took over as Chief Justice that year. Smith 
was one of t the earliest supporters of a more limited caseload for the Supreme Court 
so that the Court could focus on more complicated issues. He also acknowledged the 
political function of the Court, and he believed that this fact should not be hidden 
(1975). The selection of Smith as Chief Justice can therefore be said to mark the start 
of a transformational period which makes 1991 an apt starting point for the timeframe 
of the analysis.  
 
The next section of the data chapter will deal with the variables that will be included 
in the analysis. The table featured below gives an overview of the variables that will 
be tested, including their names, operationalization and the expected direction of the 
effect of the variable.  
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 Chief Justice from 1991 to 2002 
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Table 3: Overview of the Variables 
 
Variables Operationalization Hyp. Relationship 
forstate 
1 = Vote for State 
Depdenant variable 
0 = Vote against state 
Justice Exp. Variables     
socdemgov 
1 = Social Democratic 
+ 
0 = Non-Social Democratic 
lovavd2 
1 = Prev. employ. Legislation Dep 
+ 
0 = No 
regjeringsadv 
1 = Prev. employ. Government 
Advocate + 
0 = No 
riksadvokatembet 
1 = Prev. employ Public Prosecutor  
+ 
0 = No 
lawprofess 
1 = Prev. employ Law Professor 
- 
0 = No 
osloborn 
1 = Born in Oslo 
+ 
0 = No 
Justice Control Variables   
after2002 
1 = Selected by Judicial App. Board 
- 
0 = No 
earljudge 
1 = Prev. emply. Judge 
+ 
0 = No 
priv_prac 
1  = Prev. employ. Private practice 
- 
0 = No 
sex 
1 =Female 
no expected direction 
0 = Male 
yborn Age measured in years no expected direction 
yappoint Seniority measured in years no expected direction 
chief 
1 = Chief Justice 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
interimjustice 
1 = Interim Justice 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
Case Exp. Variables     
regjeringsadv 
1 = Gov. Adv. Present 
+ 
0 = No 
emregjeringsadv 
1 = Office of Gov. Adv. Present 
+ 
0 = No 
stateanke 
1 = State is plaintiff 
+ 
0 = State is respondent 
Case Control Variables    
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taxlaw 
1 = Tax Case 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
othereco 
1 = Economic Case 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
explaw 
1 = Expropriation Case 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
immilaw 
1 = Immifartion Law 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
adminlaw 
1 = Administation Law 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
familiylaw 
1 = Familiy Law 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
healthlaw 
1 = Health-Care Law 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
Nature 
1 = Nature Case 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
Complex2 Complexity measuured in words  no expected direction 
Panel Exp. Variables      
lovadvpan 
1 = Majority former. Leg. Dep 
+ 
0 = No 
HomogenSosdem 
1 = Homogenus Soc. Dem. App. 
+ 
0 = No 
regjeradvovertal 
1 = Majority former.Office. Gov. Adv. 
+ 
0 = No 
iSosdemovertal 
1 = Majority Non-Soc.Dem. App 
- 
0 = No 
osloovertal 
1 = Majority Born in Oslo 
+ 
0 = No 
Panel Con. Variables 
  
justitiariusipanel  
1 = Chief Justice in Panel 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
flerpriv 
1 = Majority Private Practise 
- 
0 = No 
flerarljugde 
1 = Majority former Judge 
no expected direction 
0 = No 
aggageatvote Avg. Age meassured in years no expected direction 
aggseniority Avg. Seniority meassured in years no expected direction 
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6.5 Dependant Variable 
 
The dependant variable in the analysis will be if the vote of a single justice was in 
favour of the public or the private party in a specific case. The variable is 
dichotomous, and a vote in favour of the public litigant has the value of 1 whereas a 
vote in favour of the private party has the value of 0. This dependant variable is 
functional because it goes to the heart of government friendliness and effective 
because it enables collection of the justices’ votes in all cases. It is important though 
to remember that the dependant variable only captures the end result of the judicial 
process within the Supreme Court, and no effective dependant variable could capture 
the true views of the justices not tasked with writing an opinion.  
 
6.6 Justice Level Explanatory Variables   
 
The following explanatory variables are based on the expanded attitudinal model, 
which includes personal traits and the variables are directly connected to the 
individual justice. 
 
The theoretical framework used in this thesis suggests that the vote of a justice can be 
best explained by their ideological preferences either on the individual level (Segal et 
al. 2002:86) or on a case-level (Kastellec 2011, Sunstein et al. 2006). The variables 
connected to the individual justice will consist of personal traits and the perceived 
attitudes of the justice. While most personal traits can be directly measured, the same 
does not apply for preferences and attitudes.  Therefore one must use proxy 
measurements and values that establish a plausible link to the preferences of a justice.  
 
An indicator that is commonly used as a basic measurement for political preferences 
in most studies of judicial behaviour is simply who appointed the justice
44
 (Sunstein 
et al. 2006: 8, Boyd et al. 2010, Grendstad et al. 2010, Grendstad et al. 2011a, 
Grendstad et al. 2011b, Magalhães 2003, Voeten 2007). The advantages of using the 
ideology of the appointers of a Supreme Court justice as a proxy measurement, is that 
the information is guaranteed to be correct and available for all justices. Applying 
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 Which in regard to Norway in practice is the current Government Council. 
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appointing government as a measurement has also been used extensively used in the 
Norwegian context, in particularly by Grendstad et al., who has found significant 
effects of ideology on the vote of the justices. The same measurement is also the 
foundation for ideology on the panel level.  
 
The use of appointing government as a measure on the ideology of a justice is not 
however uncontroversial. Skoghøy (2011a) and Schei (2011) argues that more precise 
knowledge of the appointment procedures would make it clear that applying 
appointing government as a measure on a justice’s ideology is basically pointless. An 
alternative way to measure ideology suggested by Grendstad (2012b) is expert 
surveys of lawyers with the right to appear before the Supreme Court
45
 and their 
perceived ideology of the justices The new measure will not however be used in this 
thesis, since the survey would only cover the current Supreme Court and therefore in 
inapplicable to all the justices in the chosen timeframe. Another potential problem 
using appointing government as a measure is that Norway has a history of coalition 
governments, which makes it more difficult to identify a clear ideology based on 
political parties
46
. This could lead to conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970).  
 
A question that therefore arises is if a dichotomous classification is sufficient to cover 
the nuances in the Norwegian parliamentary system. One reason why a dichotomous 
classification is sensible is that the Labour Party has been the lone governing party or 
the largest party in a coalition in every centre-left government, whereas every other 
government haver been centre-right within the timeframe of analysis. Therefore it can 
be said that all Norwegian governments within the timeframe of analysis followed 
one of two distinct ideological main approaches. On the other hand it is difficult to 
measure the influence of centrist parties or parties further to the left
47
 and to group the 
different governments that did not include the Labour Party as one ideological group. 
A dichotomous classification can also be seen as an advantage since it moves away 
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 “Advokat med møterett for Høyesterett” officially replaced the title Høyesterettsadvokat in 1979 
46
 It is for instance difficult to classify appointing governments when Senterpartiet has been in both 
Social Democratic and non-Social Democratic coalition governments  
47
 The same problem will occur on the right with appearance of the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) 
in government. 
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from a party-political understanding of ideology and widen ideology to a more 
general term.  
 
Following the classification by Grendstad, appointing government is a dichotomous 
variable with two possibilities. Social Democratic governments have the value of 1 
and the term understood as governments consisting of the Labour Party 
(Arbeiderpartiet) alone or as the largest party in a coalition government. Non-Social 
Democratic governments are classified as any government where the Labour Party is 
not involved, and has the value of 0. This variable forms the basis for hypothesis 1. 
 
The next explanatory variables on the individual level are connected to former 
workplace. The former workplaces that are expected to have an effect are former 
employment in the Legislation Department, working as the Director General of the 
Office of the Government Advocate or for his office, having been the Director 
General of Public Prosecutions or having previously been a law professor. The first 
three of these former occupations are expected to have a positive effect on state 
friendly voting, The law professor variable on the other hand is expected to have a 
negative influence on state friendly voting.  The former workplace variables are 
dichotomous, where the value of 1 represents former employment in the 
aforementioned positions and 0 indicates no such former employment. These 
variables are the foundation for hypotheses 2, 3,4 and 6. 
 
The last explanatory variable on the justice level is if the justice was born in Oslo, 
which is the basis for hypothesis 5. This variable is also dichotomous, where value of 
1 represents that a justice war born in Oslo and 0 that a justice was born elsewhere. 
 
6.7 Case Level Explanatory Variables  
 
The following explanatory variables are located on the second-level of the 
hierarchical model. These case-related variables are chosen to shed light on how the 
legal constraints that are out of control of the justices influence their inclination to 
vote for or against the state.  
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The importance and effect of what calibre of representation the state sends to handle 
the case on its behalf is connected to the importance of the case. The variables that 
indicates that the case is handled by the Office of the Government Advocate can shed 
light on this claim are therefore included to test hypothesis 7. Both variable
48
 are 
dichotomous, the first indicating the personal presence of the Government Advocate 
and the second a person from his office. Aforementioned presence has the value of 1, 
while non-presence has value 0. 
 
This thesis will test if cases from different areas of the law have any influence on 
whether or not the justice vote according to their perceived ideology based on 
appointing government. The 8 different areas of law that are identified in this thesis 
are: Tax cases, other economic cases, expropriation cases, immigration and asylum 
law, family law, health-care cases, administrative law and cases related to nature. All 
of the case type variables connected to hypothesis 8 are dichotomous, in where the 
variables connected to the area of law are coded with 1 if the case deals with one of 
the mentioned areas of law and 0 if they are not.  
 
6.8 Panel Level Explanatory Variables  
 
There are five explanatory variables connected to the composition of the panel. Two 
of these variables are based on appointing government; one variable indicates 
homogenous social democratic appointed panel and the other variable indicates a 
majority of justices appointed by non-social democratic governments. These two 
variables will test hypotheses 9 and 10. 
 
There are two variables based on former workplace; if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices that have worked in the Legislation Department or not and if a majority of 
the panel have worked for the Office of the Government Advocate or not. These two 
panel variables tests hypotheses 11 and 12. 
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 The Government Advocates personal appearance and the appearance of someone representing his 
Office. 
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The final explanatory variable is connected to hypothesis 13 and tells if a majority of 
the justices were born in Oslo. 
 
All of these five panel variables are dichotomous, where the value of 1 indicates one 
of the aforementioned panel compositions.  
 
6.9 Justice Level Control Variables 
 
Two of the selected control variables are connected to the former legal employment of 
the justice. The former occupations serving as control variables are if a justice has 
formerly worked as a former judge in the lower courts or as lawyer working in a 
private law firm. Having worked in the aforementioned occupations is not expected to 
a have a statistical effect on the likelihood for a judge to vote for or against state 
interests. These variables are dichotomous, the value of 1 represents former 
employment and 0 represents no such former employment.  
 
The gender of a justice has been found in numerous studies (i.e. Boyd, Epstein, and 
Martin 2010; Collins, Manning, and Carp 2010; Farhang and Wawro 2004; McCall 
2008; Songer et al. 2010) to have a statistically significant effect on judicial decisions. 
There’s however not reason to believe that gender impacts the likelihood of a justice 
voting for or against the state. Being a woman is coded as 1, while men are given the 
value of 0. 
 
Another variable that deals with the social background of the justices is their age. One 
of the hypothesis presented by Grenstad et al. (2011b:18) connects older age with a 
disposition to maintain the status quo. This hypothesis is based on the notion that 
people become more conservative as they get older. Voting to maintain the status quo 
in the context of the state friendly hypothesis, will in the vast majority of cases 
coincide with siding with the state. The Age variable is a metric variable.  
 
Another variable that is based on the assumption that the likelihood for voting to 
maintain the status quo increases over time is seniority. The longer a justice has 
served on the bench will increase the justice’s exposure to the collegial interactions 
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and socialization processes that occurs at the court. Such interaction is expected to 
make a justice more state friendly over time. The seniority of a justice is measured in 
years.   
 
The appointment procedure was changed in 2002 as mentioned in the theory chapter, 
and a control variable is therefore included to control for the effects of the 
appointment process. This variable is dichotomous, where the value of 0 indicates that 
a justice was appointed prior to 2002 and the value 1 after 2002.  
 
The Supreme Court of Norway often utilizes interim justices for shorter amounts of 
time. The appointment of these justices does not follow the normal appointment 
procedure. In theory they can be chosen because of their views on policy issues 
(Smith 2012:159-161). Such policy views are in theory often identifiable since 
interim justices most often are senior justices from lower courts. The expectation is 
that interim justices are more likely to vote in favour of state than associate justices. 
Interim justices are given the value of 1, whereas non-interim justices are coded with 
the value of 0.  
 
Whether or not a justice is the Chief Justice is also included as a control variable, 
where the value of 1 indicating that the justice is the Chief Justice.  
 
6.10 Case Level Control Variables 
 
The analysis includes a control variable that aims to measure the complexity of a case. 
The complexity of the case has been applied to analysis on the American courts 
(Collins 2008). One can in theory assume that the more important a case is, the more 
complex it will be. And the state is less likely to loose cases that are of substantial 
value as mentioned before. It is however difficult to find a clear measure on case 
complexity. As far as this writer can see, an optimal variable dealing with case 
complexity would have to include a qualitative factor based on the judicial reasoning 
in the specific case, which clearly isn’t an easy factor to take into account when 
dealing with statistical analysis and a large amount of cases. Therefore this analysis 
will utilize the number of words of the legal arguments as a substitute measurement.  
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The outcome of a case in Lagmannsretten is also likely to influence the likelihood of 
justices to vote for or against the state in the Supreme Court. Common to all levels of 
courts in Norway is that the winner in the lower court is more likely to also be the 
winner in the higher court
49
. According to this assumption the state is likely to lose in 
the Supreme Court if the state lost in the lower courts.   
 
When the state appears in the Supreme Court it is usually as the respondent
50
. 
One reason for why the state appears as the respondent in the majority of Supreme 
Court cases is according to Government Advocate Fagernæs that the state is 
restrictive in appealing to the Supreme Court. This reservation in pursuing cases to 
the Supreme Court
51
 if the case is not winnable or of great importance might lead to a 
higher than usual win ratio for the state as the plaintiff compared to other judicial 
actors. Therefore a clear prediction is difficult. The value of 0 is applied when the 
state is the respondent and the value 1 applied when the state appears as the plaintiff.  
 
6.11 Panel Level Control Variables 
 
Whether or not the Chief Justice serves on a case is also expected to influence 
decisions. There are several reasons why this is likely to occur. The Chief Justice is 
always the most senior justice, which gives him more opportunities to shape how the 
case is discussed among the justices. The Chief Justice is normally more focused on 
internal unity among the justices and creating an external image of agreement than the 
other justices (Brenner and Hagle 1996; Wahlbeck et al. 1999, 498). The value of 1 
indicates that the Chief Justice is present, and the value 0 indicates no such presence.  
 
Two former workplaces are also included as control variables. These two are former 
work as a judge and former experience from private practise. These variables are 
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 A basic reason for this is that the arguments that convinced a justice on one level is likely to also 
convince a justice on the next level if no other circumstances regarding the case have changed.   
50
 Meaning that the state won in Lagmannsretten  
51
 At least for the cases that are under the control of the Government Advocate 
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dichotomous where the value of 1 indicates a majority of justices with the specified 
experience and 0 indicating no such majority.  
 
As a continuation of the inclusion of age and seniority of the individual justice, the 
average age and seniority of a panel are also included as control variables. These 
variables are measured in years. 
 
The numerous selected variables should be able to illuminate the research question: 
What factors influences the Supreme Court Justices in dissenting cases where the 
state is one of the litigants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
Chapter 7 – Analysis 
 
This chapter will feature the analysis of dissenting Supreme Court decisions from 
1991-2012. The different analysis will be structured as mentioned in the Method 
Chapter. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the results and the impact on 
the hypotheses outlined in table 2.  
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Dependant and Explanatory Variables  
Variable Name Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dep. Variable 
      forstate Vote for State 590 0,503 0,500 0 1 
Justice level 
      SocDemGov Appointing Gov. 590 0,659 0,474 0 1 
lovavd2 Legislation Dep. 590 0,471 0,500 0 1 
riksadvokat Dir. Gen. of Pub. Pros. 590 0,076 0,266 0 1 
osloborn Born in Oslo 590 0,380 0,486 0 1 
regjadv Former Emply. Gov. Adv. 590 0,369 0,483 0 1 
lawprofess Former Law Professor 590 0,161 0,368 0 1 
Case level 
      regjeringsadv Gov. Adv. Present 590 0,017 0,129 0 1 
emregjeringsadv Office of Gov. Adv. 590 0,492 0,500 0 1 
statanke State is Appellee 590 0,314 0,464 0 1 
Panel level 
      regjadvovertall Majority Gov. Adv. 590 0,271 0,445 0 1 
HomogenSosDem Homo Soc. Dem. 590 0,068 0,252 0 1 
lovadvpan Majority Leg. Dep. 590 0,466 0,499 0 1 
osloovertal Majority Born in Oslo 590 0,297 0,457 0 1 
iSosdemovertall Majority Non-Soc. Dem. 590 0,186 0,390 0 1 
 
The table shows that the votes for and against the state is fairly even distributed with 
50.4 percent of the votes going in favour of the party representing state interests.  
 
The descriptive statistics of individual justice data shows that roughly 66 percent of 
the votes were cast by justices appointed by social-democratic governments and 34 
percent of the votes are given by justices appointed by non-social democratic 
governments. This discrepancy is natural since social-democratic governments have 
ruled for the majority of the time before and during the time period of the analysis, 
and thereby have appointed the majority of the justices included in the analysis. The 
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table also shows that a large percentage of the justices have previously worked in the 
Legislation Department (47 percent) and/or in the Office of the Government Advocate 
(37 percent). Nearly 38 percent of the justices where born in Oslo. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables on the case level shows that the 
Government Advocate or one of his employees represented the state in about half the 
cases (about 51 percent), but the Government Advocate very rarely was personally in 
charge. The data also shows that the state was only the appellant in 31 percent of the 
cases, which confirms the statements by Fagernæs that the state is restrictive in 
appealing to the Supreme Court. Tax cases represents 43 percent of the selected cases.  
 
The panel data of composition of the justices shows that justices solely selected by 
social-democratic governments presided in 6.8 percent of the cases, which shows that 
the vast majority of cases (93.2 percent) were decided in heterogeneous panels in 
terms of appointing government. Justices appointed by non-social-democratic 
governments were in majority in 18.6 percent of the cases.  
 
Justices that had previously worked in the Legislation Department were in majority in 
about 47 percent in the cases, and justices with experience from the Office of the 
Government Advocate were in majority in 27 percent of the cases. Justices born in 
Oslo were in majority in nearly 30 percent of the selected cases. 
 
7.2 The Effect of perceived Ideology  
 
One of the basic claims of the Attitudinal model is that the ideology of the justice can 
influence how state friendly a justice is. Ideology has as mentioned in the data chapter 
been given appointing government as a proxy measurement. The model below shows 
the relationship between the vote of the justices and the government that appointed 
them in dissenting cases from 1991 to 2012. 
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Table 5: Bivariate model ideological voting 
 
Variable Name Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. 
SocDemGov 0.522*** 0.175 1.686***  0.176 
_cons -0.331 0.143 0.718 0.103 
AIC 812.947 
   BIC 822.707 
   Log likelihood -408.943 
   
N 590.000     
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
   The coefficient of appointing government (SocDemGov) expresses the effect of 
having been appointed by a social-democratic government, given the value of 1. The 
coefficient is significant on the one percent level, and it has a positive direction which 
indicates the justices appointed by social democratic governments are more likely to 
vote in favour of the state, as predicted by the attitudinal model. The odds ratio shows 
that justices appointed by social-democratic governments are about 1.7 times as likely 
to vote in favour of the state compared to justices appointed by other government 
constellations. Beneath follows a predicted likelihood model that further explores the 
effect of appointing government on state friendly voting.  
 
Table 6: Predicated likelihood model ideology 
 
Appointing Government    Margin       S.E 
Social-Democratic 0.548***  0.025 
Non-Social-Democratic 0.418***  0.035 
Difference 0.131 *** 0.044 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
Table 6 shows that justices appointed by social-democratic governments are about. 55 
percent likely to vote in favour of the state, whereas justices appointed by non-social-
democratic governments are only likely to vote in favour of the state in roughly 42 
percent of the cases.  Justices appointed by social-democratic governments are 
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roughly 13 percent more likely to vote in favour of the state than the justices that were 
appointed by other governments.  
 
The results from the bivariate model and the statically significant predicted difference 
in likelihood for voting for or against the state based on appointing government gives 
support to H1: Justices appointed by social-democratic governments are more likely 
to vote in favour of public interests represented by the state than justices appointed by 
non-social-democratic governments.  
 
The AIC and BIC drops from the empty model to the bivariate model. This means 
that the variable appointing government has explanatory power on the vote of the 
justices in dissenting cases.  
 
7.3 The Effects of Justice Level Variables 
 
Table 7 shows the explanatory and control variables indicating perceived ideology 
and personal traits that are connected to the Attitudinal model. The first part of the 
table only analyses the explanatory variables while control variables are included in 
the second part of the table.  
 
The first result to take notice of in table 7 featured below is the change in effect and 
significant of appointing government. From being statistically significant in the 
bivariate model with a log odds of 0.522, the log odds is reduced to a non-significant 
0.265 and 0.346 in the multivariate model. It should however be noted that in the test 
with both explanatory and control variables, the appointing government 
(SocDemGov) variable was nearly statically significant
52
. The former law professor 
variable is significant on the 10 percent level and inclusion of the control variables 
increase the negative effect of variable 
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 The variable was significant on the 0.113 level 
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Table: 7 Multivariate model justice level variables 
 
Level-one explanatory predictors  Level-one control predictors  
Variable Name Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. 
SocDemGov 0.272 0.202 1.313 0.265 0.346 0.218 1.413 0.308 
osloborn 0.133 0.185 1.142 0.211 0.164 0.213 1.179 0.252 
regjadv -0.194 0.191 0.823 0.157 -0.039 0.235 0.962 0.226 
lovavd2 0.759*** 0.198 2.136*** 0.423 0.686*** 0.251 1.985*** 0.498 
riksadvokatembet 0.281 0.358 1.324 0.474 0.121 0.438 1.129 0.494 
lawprofess -0.469* 0.273 0.625* 0.171 -0.619* 0.350 0.539* 0.188 
chief 
    
-0.790 0.712 0.454 0.323 
interimjustice 
    
0.877 0.570 2.403 1.370 
sex 
    
-0.019 0.242 0.982 0.237 
priv_pract 
    
-0.133 0.288 0.875 0.252 
earljudge 
    
0.271 0.244 1.311 0.320 
after2002 
    
-0.390 0.283 0.677 0.191 
seniority 
    
-0.025 0.023 0.976 0.022 
ageatvote 
    
0.018 0.022 1.019 0.022 
_cons -0.447 0.200 0.640 0.128 -1.368 1.118 0.255 0.285 
AIC 790.679 796.129 
BIC 821.340 861.831 
Log likelihood --388.340 -383.065 
N 590.000 590.000 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
So what is the likely reason for the decrease in effect and significance? The model 
shows that the Legislation Department variable (lovavd2) is statistically significant on 
the 1 percent level and has a high log odds (0.759 and 0.686) of voting for the state if 
a justice had previously worked in the Legislation Department. Based on the 
theoretical assumption that work experience in the Legislation Department is 
expected to be vote in favour of the state this development is not a surprising. It is 
also unlikely that the variable of previously being a law professor should influence the 
appointing government variable to any significant extent.  
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Tables 8 featured below gives a more detailed view of how relationship between 
having worked in the Legislation Department and appointing government influence 
tvoting for or against the state.
53
 
 
Table 8: Predicated likelihood voting for state given appointing government and 
legislation department 
  
Predicted Likelihood 
Appointing Government Work Experience  Margin  S.E. 
Social-Democratic Legislation Department 0.632*** 0.064 
Non-Social-Democratic Legislation Department 0.549*** 0.082 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
    
The table shows that the predicted likelihood of a justice with experience from the 
Legislation Department voting for the state given appointing government. Compared 
to table 6
54
 the estimates indicate that prior experience from the Legislation 
Department has a stronger effect on state friendly voting than appointing government. 
The difference between appointing government is also reduced from 0.131 to 0.083 
when the justice has experience from the Legislation Department. These numbers 
indicates that the likelihood for voting in favour of the state between justices from 
different appointing governments is reduced if the justice has work experience from 
the Legislation Department.  
 
These findings indicate that the statistically significant effect of appointing 
government follows from the fact that many of the social-democratic appointees have 
previously worked in the Legislation Department. Descriptive statistics regarding the 
relationship between prior work in the Legislation Department and appointing 
government tells that 58.6 percent of the justices appointed by social-democratic 
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 The remaining variables are held constant with the following values: interimjustice=0 sex=0 
lawprofess=0 priv_pract=0 earljudge=0 after2002=0 chief=0 osloborn=0 regjadv=0 lovavd2=1 
riksadvokatembet=0 age=mean seniority=mean 
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 For Social-Democratic Appointees 0.548 versus 0.642 with experience from the Leg. Dep. and for 
appointees from other governments 0.418 versus 0.549 for justices with experience from the Leg. Dep. 
  
 
 70 
governments had previous experience from the Legislation Department, whereas this 
percentage is only 24.9 percent for justices appointed by non-social-democratic 
governments.  
 
The only other variable in the analysis of individual justice predicators that was 
statistically significant was the law professor (lawprofess) variable. The effect of this 
variable was that justices who had previously worked as a law professor was more 
likely to vote against the state.  
 
The results can be interpreted as if former workplace is central in making the justices 
predisposed to voting for (Legislation Department) or against (former law professor) 
the state. But such a statement is moderated by the fact that only two of the former 
workplace variables were statistically significant.  
 
None of the other variables connected to the individual justice were statistically 
significant. The direction of the effect of the non-significant variables is very close to 
what one should expect. Being the chief justice (chief) and having worked in private 
law (priv_pract) firms leads to voting against the state. Oslo-born justices (osloborn), 
having previously worked in the office of the Office of the Director General of Public 
Prosecutions (riksadvokat), being an interim justice (interimjustice) and being a 
former judge in the lower courts (earljudige) increases the likelihood for voting for 
the state. The other variables such as sex, age and seniority showed little effect in 
either direction. The only surprising result in terms of the direction of the effect was 
that being appointed after 2002 under the new selection method showed a negative 
effect in terms of voting for the state. This result is somewhat counterintuitive since 
most of these justices were appointed by social-democratic governments.  
 
An interesting finding is that the AIC and BIC increases when the control variables 
are included. This suggests that the control variables do not on the whole contribute to 
increasing the models explanatory power. Wald tests show that several of the non-
significant variables do not alone or collectively contribute to the models explanatory 
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power, and they are therefore tossed out.
55
 The statistically significant variables and 
variables with a relatively high Wald-score connected to the individual justice forms 
the reduced model below. 
 
Table 9: Condensed model justice level variables  
 
Variable Name Coefficient S. E.       O.R.     S.E. 
SocDemGov 0.346* 0.196 1.415* 0.277 
lovavd2 0.781*** 0.197 2.183*** 0.430 
chief -0.557 0.594 0.573 0.340 
interimjustice 0.950** 0.483 2.587** 1.248 
lawprofess -0.588** 0.293 0.555** 0.163 
earljudge 0.285 0.179 1.330 0.238 
_cons -0.647 0.206 0.524 0.108 
AIC 786.202       
BIC 816.863 
   Log likelihood -386.101     
N 590 
 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
   
     The condensed model with the non-contributory variables improves the statistical 
significance of some of the remaining variables. Appointing government 
(SocDemGov) emerges as significant on the 10 percent level in the expected positive 
direction. Interim justices are statistically more likely to vote in favour of the state.  
The variable former judge was nearly statistically significant
56
. The AIC and BIC 
drops signalling that the models overall explanatory force was increased compared to 
model 7. 
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 The following variables are dropped sex priv_pract seniority ageatvote osloborn regjadv 
riksadvokatembet after 2002 with a Wald score of chi2(  8) =    3.33 Prob > chi2 =    0.8526 
56
 p<0.11 
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7.4 The effects of Case and Panel variables 
 
The next step of the analysis is expanding the model to include case and panel 
variables. The variables from the condensed model (table 9) are included from the 
justice level. 
 
Table 10: Multivariate model including all variables 
 
Explanatory predictors  Control predictors  
Variable Name Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. 
SocDemGov 0.338 0.208 1.402 0.291 0.420** 0.214 1.521** 0.325 
lovavd2 0.852** 0.211 2.345*** 0.493 0.883*** 0.217 2.412*** 0.525 
chief -0.603 0.606 0.532 0.322 -0.560 0.624 0.571 0.356 
interimjustice 0.989** 0.485 2.750 1.331 1.018** 0.491 2.767** 1.357 
lawprofess -0.607** 0.300 0.553** 0.165 -0.624** 0.310** 0.536** 0.166 
earljudge 0.312* 0.183 1.366* 0.249 0.504** 0.199 1.656** 0.329 
regjeringsadv 1.206 0.757 3.341 2.529 0.671 0.804 1.955 1.572 
emregjeringsadv 0.043 0.175 1.045 0.185 -0.105 0.205 0.900 0.185 
HomogenSosdem -0.078 0.358 0.923 0.331 0.083 0.434 1.087 0.471 
osloovertal 0.171 0.195 1.187 0.232 0.178 0.216 1.194 0.258 
lovadvpan -0.239 0.200 0.788 0.156 -0.248 0.212 0.780 0.165 
regjeradvovertal -0.027 0.250 0.973 0.195 -0.054 0.219 0.948 0.208 
iSosdemovertal -0.178 0.251 0.836 0.210 -0.070 0.270 0.932 0.252 
flerarljugde 
    
-0.651*** 0.223 0.521*** 0.117 
flerpriv 
    
0.075 0.245 1.078 0.264 
aggageatvote 
    
0.026 0.042 1.026 0.043 
aggseniority 
    
-0.038 0.056 0.963 0.054 
statanke 
    
-0.387* 0.206 0.680* 0.140 
Complex2 
    
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
justitiariusipanel  
    
0.289 0.341 1.341 0.465 
tax 
    
0.174 0.748 1.191 0.891 
expro 
    
-0.012 0.819 0.988 0.809 
othereco 
    
0.211 0.754 1.235 0.932 
immi 
    
0.822 0.806 2.276 1.835 
admin 
    
0.703 0.812 2.020 1.639 
familiy 
    
-0.363 0.794 0.696 0.552 
health 
    
0.505 0.885 1.657 1.466 
_cons -0.535 0.287 0.613 0.176 -1.996 2.478 0.136 0.337 
AIC 794.678 797.397 
BIC 856.000 915.661 
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Log likelihood -383.339 -371.69863  
N 590 590 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
The full model (table 10) shows some interesting developments with regards to the 
individual justice predicators. The inclusion of the case and panel variables increases 
both the effect and significance level of the variable representing appointing 
government. The same is true for the variable representing former experience as 
judge. From not being statistically significant in the condensed model, it becomes 
significant on the 10.4 percent level when the explanatory variables one the second 
level are included, and the variable becomes significant on the 5 percent level
57
 when 
the level two control variables are included.  The effect of the effect of the Legislation 
Department, interim justice and the law professor variable slightly increases with the 
inclusion of the control variables.  
 
None of the newly included explanatory variables related to the case and panel are 
statistically significant without the inclusion of the control variables. The variable that 
represent if the state is the appealle (stataanke) is among the few control variables 
that is statistically significant, indicating an effect against voting for the state. The 
only other control variable that is statistically significant is the variable representing a 
majority of former judges (flerarljugde). The direction of this effect is not 
surprisingly positive, the same as the former judge variable on the individual level. 
The variable is statistically significant on the 1 percent level. 
 
The AIC score of the model with the level two explanatory variables increases 
slightly when the control variables are introduced. The AIC score for the tests 
excluding and including the control variables is however higher than in the condensed 
model, suggesting that most of the newly included variables does not contribute to the 
explanatory force of the model.  
 
Wald tests suggest that beside the statistically significant variables, only the variables 
representing if the Government Advocate (regjeringsadv) handles the cases on behalf 
                                                        
57
 p<0.011 
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of the state and the case variables that indicates an immigration or family case should 
be included in the final model. The chief justice variable (chief), included in the first 
condensed model (though not statistically significant) is also dropped before the final 
analysis due to a low Wald score.  
 
The variables that are included in the final condensed model (table 11)are: appointing 
government (SocDemGov), former employment at the Legislation Department 
(lovavd2), if a justice is an interim justice (interimjustice), if a justice is a former law 
professor (lawprofess), whether an individual justice or a majority of justices deciding 
a case has served as a judge (earlijudge, fleearlijduge), if the state is the appealle 
(statanke), if a case is a family or immigration (immi) case and whether or not the 
government advocate is handling the case on behalf of the state (regjeringsadv) 
 
Table 11Final condensed model 
 
Variable Name Coefficient S. E. O.R. S. E. Level 
SocDemGov 0.440** 0.201 1.553** 0.311 Justice 
lovavd2 0.837*** 0.201 2.309*** 0.464 Justice 
interimjustice 1.028** 0.481 2.800** 1.345 Justice 
lawprofess -0.646*** 0.297 0.524*** 0.156 Justice 
earljudge 0.509*** 0.196 1.663*** 0.326 Justice 
flerarljugde 0.686*** 0.195 0.504*** 0.098 Panel 
statanke -0.405** 0.191 0.667** 0.127 Case 
immi 0.446 0.357 1.561 0.557 Case 
familiy -0.678** 0.319 0.508** 0.162 Case 
regjeringsadv 0.781* 0.744 2.184* 1.625 Case 
_cons -0.410 0.226 0.663 0.150 
 AIC                           772.941 
 BIC                           821.122 
 Log likelihood -                        375.471 
 N                 590 
 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1  
     
There are some minor and some larger developments in the final condensed compared 
to the model that included the level two control variables. 
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The effect of the appointing government, Legislation Department and interim justice 
variables increases very slightly from the full model.  The effect of the former law 
professor variable is also somewhat increased, and it is significant on the one percent 
level in table 11 compared to its five percent significance level in model 10. The 
effect of former a justice having been a former judge and the effect of a panel 
consisting of a majority of former judges are bit higher than in the full model. The 
variable indicating if the state is the appealle becomes significant on the 5 percent 
level, a change from the 10 percent level in model 10. The variable indicating an 
immigration case remains statistically insignificant.  
 
A large change is seen in both the variable indicating a family case and the variable 
representing if the Government Advocate personally handles the case on behalf of the 
state (regjeringsadv). The family case variable goes from being statistically 
insignificant in model 10 to being significant on the 5 percent level while its effect 
nearly doubled in the negative direction. The variable that represents the personal 
appearance of the Government Advocate also becomes statistically significant (on the 
10 percent level) for the first time and its effect is moderately increased compared to 
the full model.  
 
Compared to model 10 the AIC drops by a fairly large amount from 797.397 to 
772.941, which is also lower than the AIC score of 686.202 in the first condensed 
model. This suggests that the final model has the most explanatory force of any of the 
models in this chapter.  
7.5 Different Areas of the Law 
 
With the exception of the immigration and family variable, the full model does not 
give a clear picture on how voting patterns are influenced by which type of judicial 
question that are most central in the cases. The influence of case type is explored in 
more detail in the two models below that predicts the likelihood of a justice voting for 
or against the state based on case type.  The predicted likelihood tests are based on the 
final condensed model with added case variables. The model also takes into account if 
a justice has experience from the Legislation Department since such experience has 
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been shown to have a larger (ideological) effect than appointing government in 
previous models. 
 
The average value of appointing government is based on the fact that 24.9 percent of 
the justices appointed by non-social democratic governments have experience from 
the Legislation Department, while 58.6 of the social democratic appointees have such 
experience.  
 
Table 12: Predicated likelihood
58
 of voting for the state in different case types 
 
Non-Social Democratic Social Democratic  
Case type Avg.  Non. Leg. Dep. Leg. Dep. Avg. Non. Leg. Dep. Leg. Dep. 
 Tax  0.442 0.391 0.598 0.618 0.498 0.696 
 Expropriation  0.415 0.366 0.571 0.592 0.471 0.673 
 Other Economic  0.454 0.403 0.610 0.629 0.510 0.710 
 Immigration  0.560 0.511 0.707 0.725 0.617 0.788 
 Administration  0.531 0.479 0.680 0.689 0.586 0.766 
 Family  0.295 0.253 0.439 0.460 0.343 0.547 
 Health  0.529 0.477 0.678 0.696 0.584 0.764 
 Nature  0.364 0.317 0.518 0.540 0.416 0.624 
     
The table shows some interesting results. Firstly there is a significant difference in the 
predicted likelihood of voting for or against state between justices appointed by 
different governments.  The average value indicates that justices appointed by social 
democratic governments is more likely to vote in favour of the state in all types of 
selected case types. The difference between the predicted likelihood for voting for the 
state varies from around 15 percent to 19 percent depending on the case type.  
 
Previous experience working in the Legislation Department has been shown to have a 
larger ideological effect than appointing government in previous models, and this 
view is strengthened by the results of this model. A justice appointed by a non social 
democratic government with experience from the Legislation Department is predicted 
to be nearly as state friendly as the average justice appointed by a social democratic 
                                                        
58
 All values are statistically significant on the 1 percent level, except the values of the nature variable 
which are only significant on the 5 percent level. A table of the S.E. of the model is found in Apendix 
Table 15.  
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government. The results show that justices with experience from the Legislation 
Department are about 20 percent more likely to vote in favour compared to their 
counterparts with no such experience appointed by the same government 
constellation.  
 
The results also show that the predicted likelihood for voting for or against the state 
varies between the case types. The average justice appointed by non-social 
democratic government is predicted to vote in favour of the state in more than 50 
percent of cases in immigration, administrative and health case. In family cases on the 
other hand the average justice appointed by social democratic governments is 
predicted to vote in favour of the state only about 46 percent of the time. This result 
corresponds well with the negative effect of the family variable in final condensed 
model. The high predicted likelihood to vote in favour of the state in immigration 
cases compared to the other case types also correspond well to the final condensed 
model, though this variable was not statistically significant.  
 
The results of the predicated likelihood table therefore suggest that some areas of the 
law are more prone to state friendly voting, while other areas of the law are less prone 
to state friendly voting, independent of appointing government. The areas of law that 
can be considered to be state friendly are immigration, administrative and health 
cases. Cases most closely related to family issues on the other hand is clearly not a 
state friendly area of the law, while the remaining case types can be said to be neutral.  
 
7.6 Discussion of the Results 
 
The discussion of the results will be mainly based on table 11, also described as the 
final condensed model. The case variables will not be commented on here since they 
have been discussed in more detail under the predicted likelihood test regarding 
different areas of the law. The variables that are connected to any of the hypotheses 
will mostly be discussed under the section that tests the hypotheses and only their 
effect and direction will be commented on here.  
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The direction of the effect of appointing government (SocDemGov) is as expected 
positive, and the variable is significant on the 10 percent level. The odds ratio tells us 
that justices appointed by social democratic governments are about 1.5 more likely to 
vote in favour compared to justices appointed by non-social democratic governments.  
 
The Legislation Department (lovadv2) has been shown to have a strong positive effect 
on the 1 percent significance level through all the tests the variable was included on. 
The odds ratio suggests that experience from the Legislation Department is apt to 
make a justice 2.3 times more likely to vote in favour of the state. Being an interim 
justice also has a strong positive effect of voting for the state and the variable is 
significant on the 5 percent level. Having previously been a law professor is shown to 
have a negative effect when t comes to voting for the state. Former law professor are 
about 0.5 times more likely to vote against the state interest according to its odds 
ratio.  
 
The personal appearance by the Government Advocate (regjeringsadv) is also shown 
to have a positive effect on state friendly voting. The variable is significant on the ten 
percent level, and the odds ratio shows that the justices are about 2.2 times more 
likely to vote in favour of the state if the Government Advocate handles to case on 
behalf of the state.  
 
Being a former judge (earlijudge) or sitting on a panel consisting of a majority of 
former judges (fleearlijduge) are both shown to have a positive effect on state friendly 
voting. Both these variables are significant on the one percent level, though having 
been a former judge increases state friendly voting with 1.6 times as opposed to the 
0.5 time increase by being on a panel consisting of a majority of former judges. That 
these variables show a statistically significant effect in favour of voting for the state is 
a surprise. There is not really a good theoretical explanation for why former judges 
are state friendly to this extent.  
 
The results also show a significant effect against voting for the state if the state is the 
appeallee (stataanke). The variable is significant on the 5 percent level, and justices 
are two thirds less likely to vote for the state if the state is the appealle. The direction 
of the effect of this variable could as mentioned in the data chapter gone either way 
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based on theoretical assumptions. One assumption was that the variable would be 
positive, based on the statements of Fagernæs
59
 since the state mostly only appeal to 
the Supreme Court on cases of greater importance that they have a reasonable 
expectation to win. The negative effect of the variable suggests that if the state looses 
its case in the lower courts, it will also lose in the Supreme Court. 
 
Of the four distinct claims connected to the state friendly hypothesis the analysis 
proved useful to asses claim 1; the state has a positive win rate against private 
litigants which was proved through descriptive statistics. The second claim; the state 
friendly effect occurs as a result of the individual justices ideology and personal traits 
was proved by the results of the predicted likelihood models and the multivariate 
models
60
. The third claim; the effect of ideology and personal traits is stronger in 
important cases was partly confirmed by the effect of the presence of the Government 
Advocate. The fourth claim of the state friendly hypothesis; the effect of the collegial 
nature and structure of the court was however not tested to a sufficient degree because 
since a multilevel model was not used.  
 
7.7 The Model Estimates in light of the Hypotheses 
 
The table below provides an overview of whether a hypothesis established in chapter 
4 is confirmed or disproved. What follows is a discussion of the hypotheses based on 
the results from the numerous analysis on the effect on state friendly voting in 
dissenting cases in the time period 1992-2012.The hypotheses connected to the 
attitudinal model will discussed firstly, followed by a discussion of the hypotheses 
connected to the case. The hypotheses connected to panel composition will be 
discussed lastly.  
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 Though his prediction was based solely on the cases handled by the central government.  
60
 The most relevant results to this claim was the effect of appointing government and former 
employment in the Legislation Department.  
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Table 13 Overview and assessment of the Hypotheses 
 
 Justice  Result 
H1: Justices appointed by social-democratic government are more 
Confirmed likely to vote in favour of the state than justices appointed 
by non-social-democratic governments.  
  
H2: Former employment at the Office of the Government 
Disproved 
Advocate increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state 
  
H3: Former employment at the Office of the Director General of 
 Disproved 
Public Prosecutions increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state 
  
H4: Former employment at the Legislation Department 
Confirmed 
increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state. 
  
H5: Justices born in Oslo are more state friendly  
Disproved 
than justices not born in Oslo.  
  
H6: Former Law Professors are less likely to  
Confirmed 
vote in favour of the state 
  
Case  
 
H7: The presence of the Government Advocate or someone 
Partly Confirmed 
from his office increases the likelihood of voting in favour the state 
  
H8: The effect of the ideology of the justice varies between  
Confirmed 
cases with different characteristics.  
  
Panel  
 
H9: The likelihood for voting for the state increases if the case  
Disproved is heard by a panel of justices consisting only of  
social democratic appointees  
  
H10: The likelihood of voting for the state decreases of the panel  
Disproved consists a majority of justices not appointed  
by social democratic governments  
  
H11: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel  
Disproved consists of a majority of justices who have previously worked  
in the Legislation Department. 
  
H12: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel 
Disproved consists of a majority of justices who have previously worked in 
the Office of the Government Advocate 
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H13: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel . 
Disproved 
consists of a majority of justices were born in Oslo 
 
 
The first hypothesis tests the statistical impact of appointing government on state 
friendly voting. The variable showed significant in the bivariate model (table 5), and 
the predicated likelihood tests (table 6) also showed a clear difference in the degree of 
state friendly voting based on different appointing governments in terms of ideology. 
The statistical effect of the variable varied between statistical insignificant to being 
relevant on the five percent level before the final condensed model (table 11), where 
the variable again become significant on the one percent level. It was expected that 
appointing government should have a clear effect on the justices vote, especially 
given that only dissenting cases were analysed, and the results overall showed this to 
be the case.  
 
H1: Justices appointed by social-democratic government are more likely to vote in 
favour of the state than justices appointed by non-social-democratic governments is 
therefore confirmed.  
 
The second hypothesis tested the effect on state friendly voting given if a justice had 
former experience at the Office of the Government Advocate. The variable had a 
small negative effect on state friendly voting, which was opposite of the expected 
direction in the first multivariate model (table 7), The variable was never close to 
being statistically significant and because of this in conjunction with low a Wald 
score the variable was dropped as a variable in the remaining estimations.  
 
H2: Former employment at the Office of the Government Advocate increases the 
likelihood of voting in favour of the state is therefore disproved.  
 
The third hypothesis stated that former employment at the office of Public 
Prosecutions would increase the likelihood for voting for the state. The variable had a 
relatively small positive effect in table 7, which was as expected, but it was not 
significant and was dropped from further analysis. A likely contributing factor to this 
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variable showing no clear effect or being significance is that very few of the justices 
(table 3) included in the analysis have worked in the Office of the Government 
Advocate 
 
H3: Former employment at the Office of the Director General of Public Prosecutions 
increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the state is therefore disproved.  
 
The fourth hypothesis tested if previous employment in the Legislation Department 
had a positive effect on state friendly voting. All the analysis has showed a strong pro 
state voting pattern for justices with such experience and the effects have all been 
significant on the one percent level. Though the effects of this variable was as 
expected, the extent and impact of former employment at the Legislation Department 
was larger than expected. The results that show that the effects of Legislation 
Department are more impactful regarding a pro state voting pattern than the effects of 
other former occupations are consistent with Grendstad et al. (2011b)
61
, but conflicts 
with the results from Skåre (1999) and (Grendstad et al. 2012c).  The results the 
Legislation Department has throughout the analysis been shown to be the clearest 
predicator leading to state friendly voting. and the results from table 8 and 12 for 
instance show that experience from the Legislation Department had a stronger 
influence on state friendly voting than appointing government.  
 
H4: Former employment at the Legislation Department increases the likelihood of 
voting in favour of the state is confirmed.  
 
The fifth hypothesis tested the impact of birthplace on state friendly voting. The effect 
of being born in Oslo was as expected positive as shown in the first multivariate 
model (table 7). The variable was not statistically significant however and was 
dropped from the rest of the analysis.  
 
H5: Justices born in Oslo are more state friendly than justices not born in Oslo is 
disproved.  
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 Which analyzed cases where the central government as opposed to the state as a whole was a party 
in the case.  
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The sixth and last hypothesis connected to the individual justice was if former law 
professors were less inclined to vote for state compared to the justices with no such 
former occupational experience. The variable showed a strong negative effect on 
voting for the state from its inclusion in table 7 throughout the rest of the analysis, and 
in the final condensed model (table 9) the variable was significant on the one percent 
level. The law professor hypothesis had perhaps to weakest theoretical foundation of 
the hypothesis connected to former workplace, but the results strongly suggest that 
experience as a law professor would make a justice less likely to vote for the state.  
 
H6: Former Law Professors are less likely to vote in favour of the state is therefore 
confirmed.  
 
Next follows a discussion of the hypotheses connected to the case predicators and 
panel composition.  
 
Hypothesis 7 was build on the assumption that the involvement of some judicial 
actors are more likely to lead to state friendly voting because of their position and 
expertise. Two variables where included to test this hypothesis; whether or not the 
Government Advocate handled the case in question personally in the Supreme Court 
or if someone from his office handled the case on behalf of the state. In table 10 the 
results showed a small negative and statistically insignificant effect for voting for the 
state if a case was handled by the Office of the Government Advocate. The negative 
direction of the variable was against the expectation of a positive, and due to Wald 
tests the variable was dropped from further analysis. This part of the hypothesis is 
therefore disproved.  
 
The descriptive statistics tells that while the Office of the Government appeared in 
nearly 50 percent of the cases, while the Government Advocate personally was 
involved in only 1.7 percent of the cases. This fact suggest that the Government 
Advocate only takes on few and important cases. The variable that indicated the 
personal appearance of the Government Advocate was however clearly positive in 
table 10, thought it did not become (barely) statistically significant until the final 
condensed model (table 11). Due to the strong positive effect and significance of the 
 84 
variable, the part of the hypothesis connected to the personal appearance of the 
Government Advocate seems to be correct.  
 
H7: The presence of the Government Advocates or someone from his office increases 
the likelihood of voting in favour of the state is therefore partly confirmed.  
 
The eight and final hypothesis dealt with if the degrees of state friendly voting varied 
between different areas of law. Multivariate model (table 10) showed mostly 
insignificant results connected to case type, and only health care cases had a 
significant effect with regards to state friendly voting in table 11.  
 
The predicted likelihood test on the other hand gave more interesting results. Firstly 
that justices appointed by social democratic governments where more likely to vote 
for the state in every case type. Secondly the results showed that whether a justice had 
previously worked had a stronger effect on the likelihood for voting for or against the 
state in any type of case. Thirdly the results showed clear variation between different 
areas of the law. The likelihood for voting against the state in administrative and 
immigration cases was much lower compared to other case types, and on the other 
hand that justices was more likely to vote against the state in cases connected to 
questions regarding nature.  
 
H8: The effect of the ideology of the justice varies between cases with different 
characteristics is therefore confirmed.  
 
Two of hypotheses regarding panel composition were connected to appointing 
government while the two other hypotheses were related to former workplace. The 
fifth hypothesis tested if the birthplace of a justice had an effect on state friendly 
voting.  
 
As mentioned, the lack of any clear results, which lead to all five variables being 
dropped from further tests, were probably due to the fact that the panel variables were 
the ones that most suffered from not being tested in a multilevel analysis 
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The variables homogenous socially democratic panel and majority of non-social 
democratic appointees where first included in table 10. The results showed little effect 
for or against state friendly voting and the variables was statistically insignificant and 
was dropped from further tests.  
 
H9: The likelihood for voting for the state increases if the case is heard by a panel of 
justices consisting only of social democratic appointees is therefore disproved. 
 
H10: The likelihood of voting for the state decreases of the panel consists a majority 
of justices not appointed by social democratic governments is also disproved  
 
Since former employment in the Legislation Department showed such a clear and 
significant on the individual level, one would expect that this effect would also be 
shown in a panel consisting of a majority of justices with experience from the 
Legislation Department. This was not however the case, and the non-significant effect 
the variable was actually negative.  
 
H11: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices who have previously worked in the Legislation Department is therefore 
disproved.  
 
The variable connected to previous employment in the Office of the Government 
Advocate showed no result on the individual level, and it was therefore not surprising 
that the variable connected to the panel also showed no results.  
 
H12: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices who have previously worked in the Office of the Government Advocate is 
disproved. 
 
Whether or not a justice was born in Oslo also showed an insignificant positive effect 
on the individual level, and the same was true for the variable on the panel level in 
table 10. This leads to that 
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H13: The likelihood of voting for the state increases if the panel consists of a majority 
of justices were born in Oslo is disproved.  
 
The result of the hypothesis testing was that four of the seven hypotheses based on the 
personal traits and attitudes of the individual justice were confirmed. One of the two 
hypothesis connected to case factors was confirmed, while none of the hypotheses 
regarding the composition of a judicial panel was confirmed.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
The aim of the thesis was to show to what extent ideology, personal traits, traits 
connected to the case and the composure of a judicial panel in the court influence 
state friendly voting based on the research question: What factors influences the 
Supreme Court Justices in dissenting cases where the state is one of the litigants.  
 
To test the state friendly hypothesis a model for testing this question was developed 
based on mostly research from the United States and Norway to view the effects of 
legal, attitudinal and strategic factors that might influence Supreme Court decision-
making. This model included variables connected to the individual justice, the case 
and the composition of the panel of justices. The data was test in several multivariate 
models and predicted likelihood models.  
 
The findings of the statistical analysis gave support to several of the hypotheses 
connected to different factors. Five predicators (SocDemGov, lovavd2, lawprofess, 
earlijudge and interimjustice) connected to the individual justice were identified to 
have a statistically significant effect on state friendly voting. A central finding was 
appointing government does matter, but that former employment at the Legislation 
Department matters more in influencing state friendly voting. As the analysis showed, 
former occupations (or at least some former occupations) does influence how a justice 
votes when the court considers cases here the state is a litigant. These results gives 
clear support to for the use of thee Attitudinal Model.  
 
Two predicators (statanke and regjeringsadv) related to the case found to have a 
significant effect, which is in support of the state friendly hypothesis. The 
significance of the appearance of the Government Advocate suggests that the 
importance of the case is a relevant predicator. 
 
As a result of the lack of applicability of multilevel model, the claim of the state 
friendly hypothesis that was connected to panel composition was not tested to an 
adequate degree, though one panel composition variable relating to former workplace 
was shown to have an effect. An obvious suggestion for future research is to include 
unanimous decisions so that a multilevel model can be utilized which will be much 
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more useful than a traditional logistical model for viewing collegial effects. Such an 
inclusion would make it possible to analyse the fourth claim of the state friendly 
hypothesis.  
 
The analysis also showed that the degree of state friendly voting varied between 
different areas of the law and that some areas of the law was a more state friendly area 
than others. The results showed a tendency of state friendly voting in particular 
immigration and administrative cases, whereas nature proved to be an area of the law 
with a low frequency of state friendly voting.  
 
8.1 Implications 
 
An attitudinal approach has served as the dominant model for U.S. Supreme Court 
research by social scientists for decades, and in recent years Grendstad et. al. have 
advocated for a similar approach on the Norwegian Supreme Court. Though the 
results show clear support for this approach, the results also show that other factors 
connected to the case and panel should be an essential part of the analysis when 
possible. The votes of the justices and outcome of cases should be seen as a “complex 
interaction of rules, preferences and structures” as stated by Brace and Hall 
(1993:917).  
 
The results of this study have limited implications because of the framework of 
analysis. The results are firstly limited to the Norwegian Supreme Court, and with the 
exception of common law countries, it’s isn’t likely that similar studies can be 
conducted on the higher courts of other countries. Based on the discussion on the 
applicability of the Attitudinal model there are some basic requirements that needs to 
be fulfilled to able to conduct a statistical analysis.  
 
 The results are also limited to dissenting cases, and though one can assume that the 
significant variables are also relevant in unanimous decisions, it is likely that the 
effect of the variables are more dominant in dissenting cases.  
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It isn’t very likely that any amount of social science research would lead the 
Norwegian legal community to acknowledge that non-legal aspects of a case are 
important factors leading to an outcome. Convincing the legal community of the 
importance of non-legal factors through empirical research would likely have to 
depend on analysis that either is based on qualitative data or through more complex 
operationalization of data that takes into account the actual content of the written 
ruling.  
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Appendix A: Cases 
Cases in chronological order:  
 
Rt-1991-668 Rt-1998-416 Rt-2003-293  Rt-2007-912 
Rt-1992-108  Rt-1998-607 Rt-2003-301 Rt-2008-145 
Rt-1992-242 Rt-1998-811 Rt-2003-593 Rt-2008-1510 
Rt-1992-453 Rt-1998-929 Rt-2003-833 Rt-2008-1537 
Rt-1993-396 Rt-1999-1087 Rt-2004-1074 Rt-2008-158 
Rt-1993-53  Rt-1999-1273 Rt-2004-1343 Rt-2008-1665 
Rt-1993-587 Rt-1999-1283 Rt-2004-1603 Rt-2008-240 
Rt-1993-66  Rt-1999-1303 Rt-2004-1632 Rt-2008-803 
Rt-1994-1244 Rt-1999-1312 Rt-2004-1737 Rt-2008-939  
Rt-1994-260  Rt-1999-14 Rt-2004-1921 Rt-2008-982 
Rt-1995-1 Rt-1999-1924 Rt-2004-2015 Rt-2009-1319 
Rt-1995-1506 Rt-1999-369 Rt-2004-241 Rt-2009-1485 
Rt-1995-1883 Rt-1999-425 Rt-2004-312 Rt-2009-534 
Rt-1995-209 Rt-1999-547 Rt-2004-523 Rt-2009-578 
Rt-1995-447 Rt-1999-946 Rt-2004-645 Rt-2010-1184  
Rt-1995-455  Rt-2000-220  Rt-2005-129 Rt-2010-1381 
Rt-1995-872  Rt-2000-253 Rt-2005-1550 Rt-2010-236 
Rt-1995-980 Rt-2000-402 Rt-2005-238 Rt-2010-24 
Rt-1996-1203 Rt-2000-591 Rt-2005-416 Rt-2010-366 
Rt-1996-1384 Rt-2000-772 Rt-2005-607 Rt-2010-612 
Rt-1996-1510 Rt-2001-1201  Rt-2005-65 Rt-2010-816 
Rt-1996-1684 Rt-2001-14 Rt-2005-734 Rt-2011-1043 
Rt-1996-958  Rt-2002-1247 Rt-2005-951 Rt-2011-1266 
Rt-1997-1580 Rt-2002-1331 Rt-2006-1367 Rt-2011-1601 
Rt-1997-1646 Rt-2002-1411 Rt-2006-1657 Rt-2011-1620  
Rt-1997-170 Rt-2002-1469 Rt-2006-349 Rt-2011-213  
Rt-1997-1784 Rt-2002-209  Rt-2006-593 Rt-2011-304 
Rt-1997-383 Rt-2002-456 Rt-2006-602 Rt-2011-65 
Rt-1997-534 Rt-2002-654 Rt-2007-1025 Rt-2011-910 
Rt-1997-623 Rt-2002-747  Rt-2007-1511 Rt-2012-432 
Rt-1997-70 Rt-2002-94  Rt-2007-1612 Rt-2012-585  
Rt-1998-1357 Rt-2003-1233 Rt-2007-1851 Rt-2012-667 
Rt-1998-1372 Rt-2003-1243 Rt-2007-290 Rt-2012-820 
Rt-1998-1538 Rt-2003-1827 Rt-2007-651 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics control variables  
 
Variable Name Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Justice Level 
      interimjus~e Interim Justice 590 0,041 0,198 0 1 
chief Chief Justice 590 0,029 0,167 0 1 
sex Sex 590 0,275 0,447 0 1 
priv_pract Former Private Practise 590 0,412 0,493 0 1 
earljudge Former Judge 590 0,453 0,498 0 1 
after2002 
Judicial Appoint. 
Board  590 0,212 0,409 0 1 
seniority Seniority 590 8,386 6,658 0 28 
ageatvote Age at time of Vote 590 58,775 6,957 42 70 
Case Level 
      tax Tax Case 590 0,432 0,496 0 1 
expro Expropriation Case 590 0,059 0,236 0 1 
othereco Other Economic Case 590 0,237 0,426 0 1 
immi Immigration  Case 590 0,068 0,252 0 1 
admin Administration Case 590 0,068 0,252 0 1 
familiy Family Case 590 0,085 0,279 0 1 
health Health Case 590 0,034 0,181 0 1 
nature Nature Case 590 0,017 0,129 0 1 
complexwords Case Complexity 590 5139,915 2653,222 478 19806 
statanke State is Appellee 590 0,314 0,464 0 1 
Panel Level 
      justitiari~l Chief Justice in Panel 590 0,144 0,351 0 1 
flerpriv Maj. Private Practise 590 0,331 0,471 0 1 
flerarljugde Majority former Judges 590 0,424 0,495 0 1 
aggageatvote Average age at Vote 590 58,776 2,881 51 66 
aggseniority Average Seniority 590 8,398 2,122 3 14 
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Table 15: S.D. of values in the case type model 
 
 
Non-Social Democratic Social Democratic  
Case type Avg.  
Non. Leg. 
Dep. 
Leg. 
Dep. Avg. Non. Leg. Dep. 
Leg. 
Dep. 
 Tax  0,094 0,057 0,063 0,046 0,059 0,043 
 Expropiation  0,101 0,097 0,104 0,094 0,103 0,086 
 Other Economic  0,067 0,067 0,069 0,055 0,068 0,05 
 Immigration  0,099 0,095 0,088 0,076 0,095 0,065 
 Administation  0,099 0,101 0,09 0,080 0,098 0,068 
 Family  0,072 0,067 0,09 0,078 0,077 0,079 
 Health  0,113 0,132 0,119 0,105 0,124 0,091 
 Nature  0,164 0,155 0,178 0,172 0,172 0,162 
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